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INTRODUCTION
Article II of the Constitution grants the President the "Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, pro-
vided two thirds of the Senators present concur."' When the Presi-
dent obtains the Senate's advice and consent and ratifies a treaty, the
treaty binds the United States internationally. If the treaty is "self-
executing,"' it also becomes part of domestic federal law, superseding
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Weiser, and participants in workshops held at the University of Chicago, University of
Notre Dame, University of Texas, and University of Virginia law schools.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2 By "self-executing," we mean enforceable in U.S. courts without implementing
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both prior inconsistent federal law (treaties and statutes) and prior
inconsistent state law.3
The constitutional treatymaking process was designed with a par-
ticular type of treaty in mind. In the late eighteenth century, treaties
were primarily bilateral agreements that focused on relations between
nations, regarding such issues as trade and peace. Nations entered
into reciprocal relationships with other nations to achieve mutual
gain. By contrast, many modem treaties do not regulate relations be-
tween nations and do not confer specific reciprocal benefits on the
parties. Instead, they are multilateral instruments, open for ratifica-
tion by all nations and designed to regulate the intra-national relations
between nations and their citizens. This distinction is most pro-
nounced with respect to human rights treaties.
Modern human rights treaties present several challenges for the
U.S. constitutional system. The first challenge concerns substance.
Human rights treaty provisions are sometimes in tension with either
constitutionally guaranteed rights (like the First Amendment) or well
settled and democratically popular practices (such as capital punish-
ment for heinous crimes). The second challenge concerns scope.
Human rights treaties touch on almost every aspect of domestic civil,
political, and cultural life. In addition, the language of these treaties
is often vague and open-ended. If such treaties had the status of self-
executing federal law, they would generate significant litigation and
uncertainty regarding the application and validity of numerous do-
mestic laws. The third challenge concerns structure. Constitutional
principles relating to separation of powers suggest that domestic fed-
eral law with respect to human rights should be made through a law-
making process that involves the House of Representatives. Similarly,
constitutional principles relating to federalism suggest that some mat-
ters should be regulated by state, rather than federal, officials.
For many years, these challenges led U.S. treatymakers to decline
to ratify any of the major post-World War II human rights treaties.
Beginning in the 1970s, the treatymakers crafted a way to commit the
legislation. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (distinguishing
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties).
3 The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that treaties "shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land" and that the "Judges in every State shall be bound thereby."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supreme Court has long held that treaties supersede
inconsistent state law. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796). It
also has held that when there is a conflict between a treaty and a federal statute, the
later in time prevails as a matter of U.S. law. See, e.g., Whitey v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888).
COAN)ITIONAL CONSENT
United States to human rights treaties in the international arena while
accommodating domestic concerns. They achieved these dual aims by
ratifying the treaties with a set of conditions. These conditions take
the form of reservations, understandings, and declarations-collec-
tively, "RUDs"-to U.S. ratification. The RUDs address each of the
challenges outlined above. With regard to the problem of substance,
U.S. treatymakers decline to commit the United States to certain sub-
stantive provisions in the treaties. With regard to the problems of
scope and structure, the treatymakers declare that the treaties are not
self-executing and thus not enforceable in U.S. courts until imple-
mented by congressional legislation. Treatymakers also express an
understanding that some provisions of the treaties may be imple-
mented by state and local governments rather than by the federal
government.
Many international law commentators have argued that the RUDs
are legally invalid, bad policy, or both.4 With respect to legal validity,
commentators argue, among other things: that the reservations vio-
late intemational law restrictions on treaty conditions; that the non-
self-execution declarations are inconsistent with the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution; and that the federalism understandings
are inconsistent with the national government's responsibility, under
both domestic and intemational law, for treaty violations. As for the
4 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1169, 1173
(1993); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-
Executing" and NVon-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 515, 532 (1991); Mal-
Nina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 49, 50 (1997);
Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratiflcation of Human Rights Treaties: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89
AM\f.J. L'.a"L L. 341, 342-50 (1995); Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban
on the Death Penalty forJuvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311, 1335 (1993);JordanJ. Paust, Avoiding
"Fraudulent"Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1257, 1283 (1993); John Quigley, The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287,
1302-03 (1993); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate
Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 571, 643
(1991); William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party ,, 21 BROOLJ. INT'L L. 277, 285 (1995);
David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L.
REX. 35, 77 (1978); Charles H. Dearborn, III, Note, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declara-
tions That Treaty Provisions Are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEX. L. REv%. 233, 238 (1979); Louis
N. Schulze,Jr., Note, The United States'Detention of Refugees: Evidence of the Senate's Flawed
Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 641 (1997).
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policy objections to RUDs, commentators have argued that they show
disrespect for international law and, in the words of Professor Louis
Henkin, "threaten[] to undermine a half-century of effort to establish
international human rights standards as international law.
'5
This Article challenges the conventional academic wisdom con-
cerning both the legality and desirability of RUDs attached to human
rights treaties. The RUDs, we argue, reflect a sensible accommoda-
tion of competing domestic and international considerations. Among
other things, they help bridge the political divide between isolationists
who want to preserve the United States's sovereign prerogatives, and
internationalists who want the United States to increase its involve-
ment in international institutions-a divide that has had a debilitating
effect on U.S. participation in international human rights regimes
since the late 1940s. Perhaps more importantly, the RUDs help rec-
oncile fundamental changes in international law with the require-
ments of the U.S. constitutional system. The RUDs achieve these
ends, we contend, in ways that are valid under both international and
domestic law.
To date, courts have enforced the RUDs, but no court has consid-
ered their validity in any detail.6 The practical significance of the issue
was illustrated recently in a Nevada death penalty case, Domingues v.
State.7 In that case, the State of Nevada sentenced Michael Domingues
to death for two murders committed when he was sixteen years of
age." The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit the execution of sixteen-year-old offenders.9 Dom-
ingues nevertheless challenged his death sentence in the Nevada
courts on the ground that it was inconsistent with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a multilateral treaty ratified by
the United States in 1992.1° This treaty contains a provision prohibit-
ing the imposition of a death sentence for the commission of a crime
Henkin, supra note 4, at 349.
6 See, e.g., Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994);
Sandhu v. Burke, No. 97 Civ. 4608 (JGK), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3584, at *32 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 10, 2000); Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000);
Calderon v. Reno, 39 F. Supp. 2d 943, 956 (N.D. Ill. 1998);Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d
353, 362 (D.NJ. 1998); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998);
In re Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 n.17 (D. Conn. 1997); Domingues v. State, 961
P.2d 1279, 1280 (Nev. 1998).
7 961 P.2d at 1279.
8Id.
9 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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by a person under the age of eighteen." When it ratified the treaty,
however, the United States attached a reservation stating that it did
not consent to this provision, as well as a declaration stating that the
entire treaty was non-self-executing. Domingues contended that these
conditions were invalid and should thus be disregarded by U.S. courts.
Although a majority of the Nevada Supreme Court rejected this ar-
gument, 2 two dissenting justices took Domingues's treaty argument
seriously." Arguments similar to those made by Domingues were
made recently in connection with executions scheduled in a number
of other states.
4
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I describes the historical
background of the RUDs and their principal features. Part II shows
that the international law objections to the RUDs are questionable on
their own terms and that, in any event, the conclusion usually drawn
from these objections-that the United States is bound by the human
rights treaties as if it had never attached the RUDs-is inconsistent
with international law principles relating to national consent. Part III
demonstrates that, regardless of the legality of the RUDs under inter-
national law, they are valid under domestic constitutional law and thus
must be enforced by U.S. courts. Finally, Part IV discusses a variety of
functional benefits-including benefits for international human
rights law-associated with the treatymakers' conditional consent
power.
I. HISTORY, PURPOSES, AND CONTENT OF RUDS
This Part sets out the background needed to evaluate the validity
of the RUDs. Part IA provides a brief history of conditional consent
in the United States, from the Founding until World War II. Part I.B
n Id., art. 6, par. 5, 999 U.N.T.S at 174 ("Sentence of death shall not be imposed
for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age .... ").
:24 Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1280.
Id. at 1280-81 (Springer & Rose, iU., dissenting). After requesting the views of
the Solicitor General, Domingues v. Nevada, 526 U.S. 1156 (1999), the U.S. Supreme
Court denied Domingues's petition for review. Domingues v. Nevada, 120 S. Ct. 396
(1999). The Solicitor General argued that the petition should be denied. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Domingues v. Nevada, 526 U.S. 1156 (1999) (No. 98-
8327) [hereinafter Domingues Brief].
14 See e.g., Ex Parte Pressley, No. 1981061, 2000 Ala. LEXIS 30, at *15*16 (Jan. 28,
2000); McFarland v. State, 989 S.W.2d 899, 906 (Ark. 1999); Raymond Bonner, Georgia
Execution is Stayed in Case of Youthful Offender, N.Y. TiES, Aug. 23, 2000, at A12; Frank
Green, Two Juvenile Offenders Face Execution; Gilmore, High Court Asked to Spare Them,
RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 10, 2000, at BI; United Press International, Texas Inmate
Executed for Teen MurderJan. 25, 2000.
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then explains how the development of international human rights law
after World War II led U.S. treatymakers to embrace the particular
RUDs that are the focus of this Article. Part I.C describes these RUDs
in detail.
A. A Brief History of Conditional Consent
The U.S. treatymaking process operates essentially as follows."
Representatives of the President negotiate the terms of the treaty with
foreign nations, and the President or his representative signs the
completed draft." The President then transmits the treaty to the Sen-
ate for its advice and consent. If the treaty receives the required two-
thirds vote, the Senate sends a resolution to the President approving
the treaty. 7 The President has the discretion at this point to ratify or
not ratify the treaty. 8 Ratification is the act by which a nation formally
declares its intent to be bound by a treaty. When the President signs
the instrument of ratification and the Secretary of State affixes the
Seal of the United States, the U.S. ratification process is complete.
Even at this point, however, the United States is not bound by the
terms of the treaty. The treaty only becomes binding on the United
States when the instrument of ratification is either exchanged, as is
usually the process with respect to bilateral treaties, or deposited at a
specified place, as is usually the process with respect to multilateral
treaties. 9
On numerous occasions throughout U.S. history, the President
and Senate have proposed conditions in connection with their ratifi-
cation of treaties. Indeed, approximately fifteen percent of all Article
II treaties since the Founding have been ratified subject to conditions
that require subsequent assent from other treaty parties." Usually the
Senate has proposed these conditions, but sometimes the President
has as well." The treatymakers have used a variety of labels for these
15 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 75-
120 (1993) [hereinafter CRS STUDY] (describing the various stages of the U.S. treaty-
making process).
16 Id. at 69-70.
1 Id. at 107.
is Id. at 109.
'9 Id. at 8386.
20 Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMp. L.. 89, 91, 97 (1996).
21 CRS STUDY, supra note 15, at 96-98; GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE
UNITED STATES 609-10 (1938).
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conditions, including "amendment," "reservation," "understanding,"
"declaration," and "proviso."22 For purposes of this Article, the three
most important forms of conditional consent, whatever their labels,
have been the power not to consent to particular treaty terms, the
power to consent to a treaty on the condition that it has no domestic
force in the absence of congressional implementation, and the power
to take account of the United States's federal structure in negotiating
and implementing a treaty.
Consider first the treatymakers' power not to consent to particular
treaty terms. There is no question that the President's "Power ... to
make Treaties"2 entails the power to withhold consent to particular
treaty terms. Without the power to condition consent on the negotiat-
ing partner's acceptance of proposed terms, the President would lack
the power to negotiate. This is why the President has, since our na-
tion's beginning, exercised the power to refuse to agree to particular
treaty terms. The President has always exercised plenary discretion in
this regard, and it has always been understood that he can decline to
ratify a treaty for any reason, even after the Senate has given its advice
and consent.
4
The Senate too has always exercised the power not to consent to
particular treaty terms, but it has exercised this power in a different
way and for different reasons.2 The Senate's power to "consent" en-
tails the power to block ratification of a treaty by withholding its con-
sent. Since the 1790s, this greater power to withhold consent alto-
gether has been viewed as including the lesser power to consent to
some provisions of the treaty but not others. The exercise of the con-
ditional consent power has been in part a response by the Senate to its
loss of any substantial "advice" role in the treaty process. Many of the
Founders believed that the advice function required that the Presi-
dent consult with the Senate prior to negotiating and signing a
treaty. ' During the Washington administration, however, this process
Z., Under international law, treaty conditions, regardless of how they are labeled by
particular nations, are considered "reservations" if they "purport[] to exclude or to
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that
State." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(1) (d), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 333, 8 I.L.M. 679, 681 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
' See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 184
(2d ed. 1996) ("Once the Senate has consented, the President is free to make (or not
to make) the treaty and the Senate has no further authority in respect of it.").
See CRS STUDy, supra note 15, at 102-04.
2'. RALSTON FftYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817, at 18-20 (1920); Ar-
2000]
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proved unwieldy, and the President began to submit treaties to the
27Senate without prior consultation. Since then, the Senate has not
played a substantial role in advising the President in connection with
21treaty negotiations. In order to preserve its ability to advise regard-
ing treaty terms, the Senate instead began the practice of condition-
ing its consent on amendments to the negotiated treaty.'
The first example of such conditional consent by the Senate oc-
curred in connection with the Jay Treaty with Great Britain.! This
treaty, negotiated byJohnJay in 1794, was designed to resolve a variety
of compensation, trade, and boundary disputes between the United
States and Great Britain. The treaty was controversial in the United
States due to concerns that the Washington administration had made
too many concessions to the British. A bare two-thirds of the Senate
gave their advice and consent to the treaty in 1795, but only on the
condition that an article of the treaty reserving to Great Britain the
right to restrict trade between the United States and the British West
Indies be suspended. 31 Britain accepted this condition without com-
plaint, and the treaty was ratified.s2 A few years later, the Senate gave
its advice and consent to a treaty with Tunisia on the condition that an
thur Bestor, "Advice" From the Very Beginning, "Consent" When the End Is Achieved, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 718 (1989);Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking
Clause as a Case Study, 1 PERSPS. IN AM. HIsT. 233, 257 (1984).
27 HAYDEN, supra note 26, at 11-16.
28 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 303, reporters' note 3 (1987). Although it generally has not had a significant
advice role in the treaty process, the Senate is sometimes involved in the treaty process
before and during the negotiation stage. The Senate sometimes proposes subjects for
treatymaking and approves treaty negotiators, and sometimes individual senators are
part of the negotiating team. CRS STUDY, supra note 15, at 69-81.
See CRS STUDY, supra note 15, at 96; SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR
MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 70 (1904); HAYDEN, supra note 26, at 110-11; HENKIN, su-
pra note 24, at 180.
30 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat.
116. For a discussion of the historical events surrounding the Jay Treaty, see STANLEY
ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM, 375-449 (1993).
31 The Senate stated that it was consenting to the treaty:.
on condition that there be added to the said treaty an article whereby it shall
be agreed to suspend the operation of so much of the 12th article, as respects
the trade which his said Majesty thereby consents may be carried on, between
the United States and his islands in West Indies.
SENATE EXEC.JOURNAL, 4TH CONG., Special Sess.,June 24, 1795, at 186.
32 HAYDEN, supra note 26, at 87; HAYNES, supra note 21, at 607-08. The Senate also
began attaching interpretive conditions to its consent early in U.S. history. For exam-
ple, in consenting to a 1796 treaty between the United States and the Creek Indians,
the Senate stated that provisions in the treaty allowing the federal government to es-
tablish military and trading posts in the Creeks's territory should not be construed to
preempt rights Georgia had been claiming in this land. HAYDEN, supra note 26, at 99.
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article in the treaty be suspended and renegotiated, and the article
was in fact renegotiated prior to ratification." The Senate again exer-
cised its conditional consent power in connection with an 1800 treaty
between the United States and France.m
The United States's treaty partners did not always respond favora-
bly to the Senate's conditions. In negotiating an 1803 boundary treaty
with the United States, Great Britain would not accept the amend-
ment proposed by the Senate, and the treaty was never ratified." The
head of the British Foreign Office at that time criticized the United
States's conditional consent practice, calling it "new, unauthorized
and not to be sanctioned."" Great Britain similarly complained about
conditions proposed by the Senate in connection with an 1824 treaty
concerning the African slave trade." Over time, however, this practice
became generally accepted by the international community.Y The
United States engaged in this practice in connection with numerous
treaties during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, generally
without controversy, as did many of its treaty partners." This practice
of not consenting to particular treaty terms has continued to the pres-
ent day.
The second type of conditional consent of importance to this Ar-
"A Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Aug. 28, 1797, U.S.-Tunis., T.S. No.
360, at 1088 n.1. The article in question provided for the imposition of customs duties
to be paid by citizens of each country upon goods carried into the other country.
Among other things, the Senate objected to this article on the ground that it violated
most favored nation clauses in treaties the United States had with other nations.
HAYDEN, supra note 26, at 109-11.
t The Senate gave its consent on the conditions that one of the articles of the
treaty be expunged and that the operation of the treaty be limited to a period of eight
years from the time of the exchange of ratifications. HAYDEN, supra note 26, at 121.
This treat) was subsequently ratified subject to the Senate's conditions. Id. at 123-24.
"'. The treaty was the King-Hawkesbury Convention. The proposed amendment
would have deleted an article of the treaty that the Senate was worried might interfere
with U.S. rights in the newly purchased Louisiana Territory. HAYDEN, supra note 26, at
145-56.
'9 Id. at 150.
,7 5JouN BASSETT MooRE, A DIGEST OF INTEPLNATIONAL LAw § 748, at 200 (1906).
In response, then-Secretary of State Henry Clay reminded Great Britain that the Sen-
ate's conditional consent power was a function of the constitutional division of the
treat), power between the President and the Senate and that this was something that
"the government of the United States has always communicated to the foreign powers
with which it treats, and to none more fully than to the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Ireland." ROBERT T. DEvIrN, THE TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
OFTHE UNITED STATES § 64, at 61-62 n.18 (1908).
See HAYDEN, supra note 26, at 156.
For examples, see DAvID HUNTER MIL=ER, RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES: THEIR
EFFECT AND THE PROCEDURE IN REGARD THERETO (1919).
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ticle is the power to render the treaty without domestic force unless
and until Congress enacts federal implementing legislation. Although
the particular "non-self-execution" clauses attached to human rights
treaties appear to be a modem phenomenon, the proposition that
treaties and other federal laws may be non-self-executing has been
well established throughout U.S. history.0 Moreover, there are at least
two longstanding precursors to the modem non-self-execution
clauses.4 1 First, in a number of instances in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, U.S. treatymakers consented to treaties on the
condition that the treaties, or particular articles in the treaties, would
take effect only after Congress passed legislation implementing
them.4' These conditions were, in essence, international non-self-
execution clauses. They differed from the modem non-self-execution
clauses in that they prevented the treaty provisions from binding the
United States until Congress acted, whereas the modem non-self-
execution clauses simply prevent the treaty provisions from being en-
forced in U.S. courts until Congress acts. Nevertheless, these condi-
tions were designed to accomplish precisely the same goal as the
modern non-self-execution clauses: inclusion of the House of Repre-
sentatives in the domestic implementation of treaties. 43
Another precursor to the modem non-self-execution clauses were
the instances, dating back to at least the late 1800s, in which the
United States expressly reserved certain treaty implementation issues
40 See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
41 Many of the following examples can be found in Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers
and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1151 (1956).
These conditions were especially common in connection with bilateral trade
agreements because of the concern that the Constitution might require that changes
in U.S. import duties originate in the House of Representatives. See I WESTEL W.
WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 558-60 (2d ed. 1929).
For example, an 1854 trade treaty with Great Britain provided that it would not take
effect until the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament enacted "laws required to
carry it into operation." Reciprocity Treaty with Great Britain, June 5, 1854, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., art. 5, 10 Stat. 1089, 1092. Similarly, a provision in an 1875 trade treaty with Ha-
waii stated that the treaty would not take effect "until a law to carry it into operation
shall have been passed by the Congress of the United States of America." Convention
between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Is-
lands,Jan. 30, 1875, U.S.-Hawaii, art. V, 19 Stat. 625, 627. Additionally, in a 1902 trade
treaty with Cuba, the Senate added an amendment stating that the Convention "shall
not take effect until the same shall have been approved by the Congress." Commercial
Convention between the United States and Cuba, Dec. 11, 1902, U.S.-Cuba, art. 11, 33
Stat. 2136, 2142. The Supreme Court subsequently gave effect to the Senate's
amendment of the Cuba treaty in United States v. American Sugar Refining Co., 202 U.S.
563 (1906).
43 SeeWILLOUGHBY, supra note 42, at 558.
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for Congress. For example, in an 1899 treaty with Spain concerning
the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the U.S. treaty-
makers included a provision stating that "[t]he civil rights and politi-
cal status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to
the United States shall be determined by the Congress."4 Similarly,
the Senate gave its advice and consent to a 1920 treaty with Austria
with the stipulation that the United States would not be represented
in or participate in any international body authorized by the treaty
"unless and until an Act of the Congress of the United States shall
provide for such representation or participation. "47
A third type of conditional consent of relevance to this Article
concerns the United States's federal structure of government.
Throughout U.S. history, the treatymakers have used their conditional
consent powers to guard against undue intrusions on state preroga-
tives. At times, they have limited the substantive terms of treaties to
protect state interests.4' At other times, they have made treaties de-
pendent on state law,47 or have expressly limited U.S. treaty obligations
44 Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, 30 Stat. 1754, 1759. Several Supreme Court
Justices expressly endorsed the validity of this provision. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244, 340-41 (1901) (White, J., concurring). The entire Court referred to it ap-
provingly in dicta in Dor v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143 (1904). See also Fourteen
Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 182, 184-85 (1901) (Brown, J., concur-
ring) (stating that there was "no doubt" that the U.S. treatymakers could provide that
customs relations between territories ceded by treaty and the United States "should
remain unchanged until legislation had been had upon the subject").
45 Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Austria, Aug. 24, 1921, U.S.-Aus.,
42 Stat. 1946, 1949. An identical provision was included in a post-World War I peace
treaty with Germany. Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Germany, Aug.
25, 1921, U.S.-F.R.G., 42 Stat. 1939, 1945. Another example of an early twentieth cen-
tury condition designed to limit a treaty's domestic effect was a statement by the Senate
in consenting to a 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan that the treaty
.shall not be deemed to repeal or affect any of the provisions" in a specified immigra-
tion statute. Mt.LER, supra note 39, at 60-63.
41, See, e.g., Ralston Hayden, The States'Rights Doctrine and the Treaty-Making Power, 22
AM. HIST. REV. 566, 585 (1917) (explaining that, between 1830 and 1860, "the Senate
and the executive entertained grave and increasing doubts concerning their authority
to make treaties" concerning rights to real property and that "in every particular in-
stance in which conflict arose the treaty in question was amended to bring it more
nearly into accord with the states' rights theory").
See, e.g., Consular Convention Between the United States of America and His
Majesty the Emperor of the French, Feb. 23, 1853, U.S.-Fr., art. VII, 10 Stat. 992, 996
(allowing French citizens to possess land equally with U.S. citizens "[i]n all the States
of the Union whose existing laws permit it, so long and to the same extent as the said
laws shall remain in force" and promising that the President would "recommend to
[other states] the passage of such laws as may be necessary for the purpose of confer-
ring this right").
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to matters "'within the jurisdiction' of the federal government."' 8 The
federalism clauses attached by the treatymakers to the U.S. ratification
of modem human rights treaties reflect this tradition.
In sum, since the early days of the nation, the President and the
Senate have attached a variety of conditions to their consent to trea-
ties. No court has ever invalidated these conditions. On the contrary,
the Supreme Court has referred to the treatymakers' conditional con-
sent power approvingly in several decisions,49 and the state courts and
lower federal courts have almost uniformly given effect to these condi-
tions.50
B. Human Rights Treaties and the Bricker Amendment Debates
Before World War II, international law primarily regulated inter-
actions among nations, and it did not contain extensive protections
for individual rights.5' Soon after the War, with the experience of the
Holocaust and other atrocities fresh in mind, the international com-
munity began to develop a comprehensive body of international hu-
man rights law. The seeds of this human rights law revolution were
sown in the 1940s. The United Nations Charter, which came into
force in 1945, contained general commitments to protect human
rights. Three years later, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide"5 and opened it for national ratifications. That
48 HENKIN, supra note 24, at 192 n.*; Henkin, supra note 4, at 345.
4 In addition to the decisions cited supra notes 42 and 44, see James v. Dravo Con-
tracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148 (1937) (noting that "it is familiar practice for the Senate
to accompany [its consent to treaties] with reservations"); Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 32, 35 (1869) (noting that the Senate is "not required to adopt or reject [a
treaty] as a whole, but may modify or amend it"). See also United States v. Stuart, 489
U.S. 353, 374-75 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurring) ("[The Senate] ... may, in the form of
a resolution, give its consent [to a treaty] on the basis of conditions."); Fourteen Dia-
mond Rings, 183 U.S. at 183 (Brown, J., concurring) ("The Senate ... may refuse its
ratification, or make such ratification conditional upon the adoption of amendments
to the treaty.").
50 For recent citations, see supra note 6. The only judicial decision suggesting lim-
its on the conditional consent power is Power Authority of New York v. Federal Power Com-
mission, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss as
moot sub nom. American Public Power Association v. Power Authority of New York, 355 U.S. 64
(1957), discussed infra text accompanying notes 236-46.
51 For discussions of pre-World War II international law protections for human
rights, see Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 169-73 (1995);
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOcRIsY 73-126 (1999).
52 U. N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
53 Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
CONDITIONAL CONSENT
same year, the General Assembly issued its nonbinding, but nonethe-
less influential, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.5 4 The Uni-
versal Declaration, which aspired to be a "common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations," 5 contained broadly
worded civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Immedi-
ately following the passage of the Declaration, the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights began drafting a human rights cove-
nant that aimed to convert the nonbinding provisions of the Declara-
tion into binding treaty obligations."
United States officials played a prominent role in creating the
emerging international regime of human rights law. Nonetheless,
there were intense debates in the United States during the 1950s over
whether and to what extent the nation should participate in this re-
gime. These debates focused principally on the domestic implica-
tions of ratifying the human rights treaties. Some people were con-
cerned that the U.N. Charter's human rights provisions would give
Congress the power to enact civil rights legislation otherwise beyond
its constitutional powers.58 This was a plausible belief in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland, which held that,
when implementing a treaty, Congress is not subject to the federalism
limitations applicable to the exercise of its Article I powers." A re-
lated concern was that the U.N. Charter would preempt state laws by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause. 6o In fact, this argument was seemingly
endorsed by one lower California court and four justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court in their consideration of the validity of a California
alien land ownership statute." The potentially self-executing nature
" GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNITED NATIONS, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. A/810, U.N. Sales No. 1952.1.15 (1952) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION].
5 Id. para. 8.
This drafting process would eventually lead to the promulgation of two human
rights treaties-the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights. See LELAND M. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS
247-53 (1959) (describing the transition from the nonbinding Declaration to the obli-
gations of the covenants).
5 See generally NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE
SENATE (1990); DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERS: A
TEST OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988).
5 See generaly TANANBAUM, supra note 57.
'i 252 U.S. 416,433 (1920).
TANANBAUM, supra note 57, at 1-15.
See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649 (1948) (Black, J., concurring, joined
by Douglas, J.); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring, joined by Rutledge, J.); Sei Fujii v.
State, 217 P.2d 481,487 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1950), vacated, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
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of the Charter was particularly worrisome to some in the early days of
the anticommunist Cold War period because the Universal Declara-
tion, including its very progressive provisions concerning economic,
social, and cultural rights,2 was described by its proponents as giving
content to the vague human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter."
Another event that triggered concerns in the United States was
President Truman's submission of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to the Senate in 1948. Al-
though the United States had helped to draft the Convention and
supported an international prohibition on genocide, many senators
and others worried about the domestic consequences of ratifying the
treaty. One of their central concerns was the vagueness of the Con-
vention's definition of "genocide." The Convention defined genocide
to include certain acts "committed with intent to destroy" covered
groups, including the act of causing "mental harm" to members of cov-
ered groups.64 The unease over these definitional provisions related
to their possible inconsistency with the First Amendment, their poten-
tial use as a basis for prosecuting U.S. military officials abroad, and
their foreseeable use in support of a claim that U.S. policies toward
African-Americans and Native Americans constituted genocide."
There was also a more general concern about the erosion of U.S. sov-
ereignty and independence.
These various concerns led to proposals in the 1950s to amend
the Constitution to limit the treaty powers of the United States."
Along with leaders of the American Bar Association, a key proponent
of such an amendment was Senator John Bricker of Ohio, and the
various proposed amendments are commonly referred tojointly as the
"Bricker Amendment."6 In general, the proposed amendments were
intended to preclude treaties from being self-executing and to make
clear that treaties would not override the reserved powers of the
62 The Declaration states, among other things, that "[elveryone" has the right to
employment, to equal pay for equal work, to membership in trade unions, to an ade-
quate standard of living, to an education, and to participation in the cultural life of the
community. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 54, arts. 23-27.
63 In fact, the lower court's decision in Sei Fujfii relied on the Universal Declaration
in interpreting the meaning of the United Nations Charter. 217 P.2d at 487-88.
64 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, art. H, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
65 For a summary of the lengthy congressional hearings in which these and other
concerns were articulated, see KAUFMAN, supra note 57, at 42-59.
6Id.
67 See generally TANANBAUM, supra note 57.
6Id.
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states' Some versions also would have restricted the use of executive
agreements." There was substantial consideration of these proposals
during the 1950s. 7 1 In fact, one of the proposed amendments fell only
one vote short of obtaining the necessary two-thirds vote in the Sen-
ate.7 ,
To help defeat the Bricker Amendment, the Eisenhower admini-
stration made a commitment that it would not seek to become a party
to any more human rights treaties.73 Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles announced during the Bricker Amendment hearings in 1953
that the administration had no intention of becoming a party to the
then-proposed human rights treaties. 7  In 1955, Dulles reaffirmed
that "the United States will not sign or become a party to the cove-
nants on human rights, the convention on the political rights of
women, and certain other proposed multilateral agreements. In the
same year, the State Department published a circular stating, in obvi-
ous reference to the Bricker Amendment debate, that "[t]reaties are
not to be used as a device for the purpose of effecting internal social
changes or to try to circumvent the constitutional procedures estab-
lished in relation to what are essentially matters of domestic con-
cern."74 For decades thereafter, presidents did not submit major hu-
man rights treaties to the Senate (although they did continue to seek
77the Senate's advice and consent for the Genocide Convention).
,," For example, some versions of the Bricker Amendment provided that "[a] treaty
shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation
which would be valid in the absence of treaty." S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong. § 2 (1952).
7, For example, some versions of the Bricker Amendment provided that
"[e]xecutive agreements shall not be made in lieu of treaties." S.J. Res. 102, 82d Cong.
§ 4 (1951).
71 See, e.g., Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.. Res. 43
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 83d Cong. (1953) [hereinafter
1953 Hearings].
"! 100 CONG. REC. 2251 (1954); TANANBAUM, supra note 57, at 180.
7,4 KAU, FMAN, supra note 57, at 104-05; TANANBAUM, supra note 57, at 89, 199.
74 1953 Hearings, supra note 71, at 825 (statement of Secretary Dulles). During
these hearings, executive branch officials also assured the Senate that it had the power
to give its consent to human rights treaties on the condition that they would be non-
self-executing. Id. at 922 (testimony of Attorney General Brownell).
75 32 DEP'T ST. BULL. 820, 822 (1955).
U.S. State Dep't Circular No. 175,1 2 (Dec. 13, 1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J. INT'L
L. 784,785 (1956).
77 The United States did ratify three less-controversial human rights treaties be-
tween the time of the Bricker Amendment controversy and the Carter administration:
the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Insti-
tutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, opened for signature Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T.
3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for sig-
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This reticence changed with the Carter administration, which
submitted a package of human rights treaties to the Senate in the late
1970s.78 Since that time, every President has urged the Senate to ap-
prove the ratification of major human rights treaties, and the Senate
has in fact given its advice and consent to four such treaties.79 With
respect to the treaties to which the Senate has given its advice and
consent, there has been a remarkable consensus across very different
administrations and very different Senates about both the desirability
of ratifying these treaties and the need to attach RUDs to the treaties
as a condition of ratification to protect domestic prerogatives.
As for the desirability of ratifying human rights treaties, presidents
and the Senate have agreed that a failure by the United States to ratify
the major human rights treaties would result in at least two kinds of
foreign policy costs. First, nonratification would preclude the United
States from participating in the treaty-related institutions that, in turn,
influence the course of international human rights law.8 ° Second,
nonratification would create a "troubling complication" in U.S. di-
plomacy, namely, that the United States could not credibly encourage
other nations to embrace human rights norms if it had not itself em-
81braced those norms.
Presidents and the Senate have also agreed, however, that the
modern human rights treaties implicate serious countervailing con-
siderations reminiscent of the Bricker Amendment debates. These
concerns are easiest to understand with respect to the most ambitious
of these treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"). The ICCPR contains dozens of vaguely worded
rights guarantees that differ in important linguistic details from the
nature Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; and the Inter-American Con-
vention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women, May 2, 1948, 27 U.S.T. 3301,
O.AS.T.S. No. 3.
78 In 1978, the Carter Administration transmitted four human rights treaties to the
Senate: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, oenedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; and the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123. In 1980, the Administration transmitted to the Senate the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature
Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
79 See infra note 86.
See, e.g., Four Treaties Relating to Human Rights, Hearings before the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 96th Cong. 21 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Hearings] (testimony of Deputy Sec-
retar of State Warren Christopher concerning ICCPR).
8 See, e.g., id.
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analogous guarantees under U.S. domestic law.8' Some of these provi-
sions arguably conflict with U.S. constitutional guarantees."' In addi-
tion, the ICCPR, if self-executing, would have the same domestic ef-
fect as a congressional statute and thus would supersede inconsistent
state law and prior inconsistent federal legislation. There was concern
that, even if courts ultimately decided that each of the differently
worded provisions in the ICCPR did not require a change in domestic
law, litigation of these issues would be costly and would generate sub-
stantial legal uncertainty. 84 These concerns also arose, although on a
narrower scale, with respect to the other human rights treaties.
To address these concerns, President Carter and every subsequent
President have included proposed RUDs with their submission of hu-
man rights treaties to the Senate.5 The Senate has given its advice
For example, the ICCPR bars "arbitrary arrest or detention," requires that any-
one arrested "shall be promptly informed of any charges against him," protects against
"arbitrary... interference with ... privacy, family, home or correspondence," guaran-
tees that everyone "shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and relig-
ion," requires that the law give "effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status," guarantees the "equal right of men
and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights," guarantees "the inherent
right to life," ensures that "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person," guarantees
the "right to hold opinions without interference," secures "the right to freedom of as-
sociation with others, including the right to form and join trade unions," prohibits
"torture or... cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," and guaran-
tees the "right of self-determination[, including the right] freely [to] determine
[one's] political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment." ICCPR, supra note 10, arts. 6-18, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174-78.
4 See, e.g., 1979 Hearings, supra note 80, at 30 (testimony of President Carter's State
Department Legal Advisor, Roberts Owen).
X4 See, e.g., id. at 40 (testimony of Jack Goldidang, Department of Justice) ("If the
treaties were directly enforceable in court, the court would have the difficult job of try-
ing to reconcile how these four treaties fit together with existing [U.S. law].").
President Reagan proposed RUDs in submitting the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, apenedfor signa-
ture Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 [hereinafter Torture Convention], and in resubmit-
ting the Genocide Convention; President Bush did the same in resubmitting the Tor-
ture Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and
President Clinton proposed RUDs when he resubmitted the Race Convention. In ad-
dition, presidents have proposed RUDs for several human rights treaties that the
United States has signed but not yet ratified, including the American Convention on
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, S. ExEc. REP. 103-38, at 5 (1994); Message from the President of the United
States Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 95-
2, at viii-xi (1978) (describing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
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and consent to, and the United States has ratified, four of these trea-
ties: the Genocide Convention, ratified in 1988; the ICCPR, ratified in
1992; the Torture Convention, ratified in 1994; and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, also ratified
in 1994. The United States included RUDs in the ratification instru-
ments for each of these treaties as a precondition of U.S. ratification.!6
The Senate usually consented to the RUDs in the form proposed by
the President, but sometimes the Senate modified them slightly or re-
quested that the President modify them.87
C. An Overview of Modern RUDs
RUDs are designed to harmonize the treaties with existing re-
quirements of U.S. law and to leave domestic implementation of the
treaties to Congress. They cover a variety of subjects and take a variety
Cultural Rights); Human Rights Treaties: Message to the Senate, 14 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978) (transmitting human rights treaties to the Senate and
recommending consent to their ratification). President Carter was not the first to
propose conditions along with a human rights treaty. As early as 1950, understandings
and declarations had been proposed in connection with the Genocide Convention. See
KAUFMAN, supra note 57, at 206 (listing attachments proposed by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee for the Genocide Convention); see also id. at 197 ("Reservations
have been a key component of human rights treaties from the earliest consideration of
the Genocide Convention.").
86 See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. REC. S14326
(daily ed. June 24, 1994) [hereinafter U.S. RUDs to Race Convention]; U.S. Senate
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REc. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter
U.S. RUDs to ICCPR]; U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 136 CONG. REC. S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) [hereinafter U.S.
RUDs to Torture Convention]; U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Rati-
fication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, 132 CONG. REc. S1378 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) [hereinafter U.S. RUDs to Geno-
cide Convention]. The text of these RUDs is available at the University of Minnesota's
excellent human rights library web site, http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/
usres.html.
87 The Reagan Administration's proposed RUDs to the Torture Convention were
criticized by some senators and human rights groups as being too restrictive. In light
of this criticism, as well as a special request from the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, the Bush Administration submitted a revised and less restrictive set of RUDs.
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONs, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT,
S. ExEc. REP. NO. 101-30, at 4 (2d Sess. 1990); see also S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30 app. A
(2d Sess. 1990) (letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs,
Department of State, to Senator Claiborne Pell, transmitting Bush Administration Res-
ervations, Understandings and Declarations).
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of forms. For purposes of analysis, they can be grouped into five cate-
gories:
Substantive Reservations. Some RUDs are reservations pursuant to
which the United States declines to consent altogether to certain pro-
visions in the treaties. These reservations are very much the exception
to the rule; for each of the four human fights treaties under consid-
eration, the United States consented to a large majority of the provi-
sions. Some substantive reservations are based on potential conflicts
between treaty provisions and U.S. constitutional rights. For example,
First Amendment concerns led the United States to decline to agree
to restrictions on hate speech in the Race Convention "to the extent
that [such speech is] protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States." Similarly, the United States attached a reservation to
its ratification of the ICCPR, stating that the ICCPR's restriction on
propaganda for war and hate speech "does not authorize or require
legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the
right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and
laws of the United States."89
Other substantive reservations are based not on a constitutional
conflict but rather on a political or policy disagreement with certain
provisions of the treaties. For example, the United States attached to
its ratification of the ICCPR reservations allowing it to impose crimi-
nal punishment consistent with the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amend-
ments, including capital punishment of juvenile offenders, notwith-
standing limitations on such punishment in the ICCPRI90 The United
U.S. RUDs to Race Convention, supra note 86, para. 1(1), at S14326.
" U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 86, para. I(1), at S4783. With respect to the
Genocide Convention, the United States sought to protect First Amendment interests
by attaching a reservation stating that "[n]othing in this Convention requires or
authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by
the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States." U.S. RUDs
to the Genocide Convention, supra note 86, para. 1(2), at S1378; see also REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, S. ExEc. REP. No. 99-2, at
20-21 (1985) [hereinafter GENOCIDE CONVENTION REPORT] (explaining that this res-
ervation was designed primarily to avoid conflict with the First Amendment).
". Article 6(5) of the ICCPR provides that "[s]entence of death shall not be im-
posed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be
carried out on pregnant women" and Article 7 provides that "[n]o one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishmenL"
ICCPR, supra note 10, arts. 6(5), 7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175. The pertinent U.S. RUDs pro-
,ided that "the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional con-
straints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman)
duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital pun-
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States attached a similar reservation with respect to limitations on
punishment in the Torture Convention.9' It also attached a condition
to its ratification of the Race Convention making clear that it was not
agreeing to modify the traditional public/private distinction in U.S.
civil rights law.92
Interpretive Conditions. Some RUDs set forth the United States's in-
terpretation of vague treaty terms, thereby clarifying the scope of
United States consent. For example, Articles 2(1) and 26 of the
ICCPR prohibit discrimination not only on the basis of "race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, [and] birth," but also on the basis of any "other
status."93 The United States attached an understanding stating that
this open-ended prohibition on discrimination did not preclude legal
distinctions between persons "when such distinctions are, at mini-
mum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.""' It
also attached a reservation to both the ICCPR and the Torture Con-
vention stating that the United States considers itself bound by the
prohibitions in those treaties on "cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment" only to the extent that such treatment or
punishment is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution." The United
ishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen
years of age" and that "the United States considers itself bound by Article 7 to the ex-
tent that 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra
note 86, paras. I(2)-(3), at S4783.
91 See U.S. RUDs to Torture Convention, supra note 86, para. I(1), at S17491.
[T]he United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16
to prevent 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,' only inso-
far as the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'
means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited
by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States.
Id.
92 See U.S. RUDs to Race Convention, supra note 86, para. 1(2), at S14326.
To the extent.., that the Convention calls for a broader regulation of private
conduct [than is customarily the subject of governmental regulation], the
United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention to enact
legislation or take other measures under paragraph (1) of Article 2, subpara-
graphs (1) (c) and (d) of Article 2, Article 3 and Article 5 with respect to pri-
vate conduct except as mandated by the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
Id.
93 ICCPR, supra note 10, arts. 2(1), 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173, 179 (emphasis added).
94 U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 86, para. 11(1), at S4783.
95 Id. para. I(3), at S4783; U.S. RUDs to Torture Convention, supra note 86, para.
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States similarly attached understandings to its ratification of the
Genocide and Torture Conventions clarifying the circumstances un-
der which conduct will fall within the terms of these treaties."6
Non-Self-Execution Declarations. U.S. treatymakers also have in-
cluded, when ratifying human rights treaties, declarations stating that
the substantive provisions of the treaties are not self-executing.
97
These declarations are designed to preclude the treaties from being
enforceable in U.S. courts in the absence of implementing legislation.
As the State Department explained in submitting the proposed trea-
ties to President Carter for his transmission to the Senate, "[w]ith
such declarations, the substantive provisions of the treaties would not
of themselves become effective as domestic law."98
The treatymakers have given several reasons for these declara-
tions. First, they believe that, taking into account the substantive res-
ervations and interpretive conditions, U.S. domestic laws and reme-
I(1), at S17491. These reservations were in part a response to the European Court of
Human Rights's 1989 decision in the Soering case, in which the Court held that a long
wait on death row would violate the European Convention on Human Rights's prohi-
bition on "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Soering v. United King-
dom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) (1989); see REPORT OF THE COMMITEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLmcAL RIGHTS, S. ExEc. REP.
102-23, at 12 (1992) [hereinafter ICCPR REPORT]; David P. Stewart, United States Ratifi-
cation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Un-
derstandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1183, 1193 (1993).
The understanding attached to the Genocide Convention provides that the re-
quirement in the Convention of an "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group as such" means "the specifw intent to destroy, in
whole or in substantialpart, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such." U.S.
RUDs to Genocide Convention, supra note 86, para. 11(1), at S1377 (emphasis added).
The understanding attached to the Torture Convention provides, among other things,
that "in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to pro-
longed mental harm." U.S. RUDs to Torture Convention, supra note 86, para.
11(1) (a), at S17491.
,7 A non-self-execution declaration was not attached to the Genocide Convention,
but the Senate did include a declaration stating that the President was not to deposit
the U.S. instrument of ratification until after Congress had enacted legislation imple-
menting the treaty. U.S. RUDs to Genocide Convention, supra note 86, para. III, at
S1378. Senator Hatch (who helped fashion the reservations package to the Genocide
Convention) explained that this declaration meant that, in effect, "the Genocide Con-
vention is not to be self-executing." 132 CONG. REC. S1252-04 (1986). Furthermore,
even the implementing legislation for the Convention, which makes genocide a federal
criminal offense, states that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed
as ... creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in
anyproceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 1092 (1994).
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Four Treaties Per-
taining to Human Rights, supra note 85, at vi (letter of submittal from Dept. of State,
Dec. 17, 1977).
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dies are sufficient to meet U.S. obligations under human rights trea-
ties.99 There is thus no additional need, in their view, for domestic
implementation."" Second, there is concern that the treaty terms, al-
though similar in substance to U.S. law, are not identical in wording
and thus might have a destabilizing effect on domestic rights protec-
tions if considered self-executing. TM Third, there is disagreement
about which treaty terms, if any, would be self-executing. The declara-
tion is intended to provide certainty about this issue in advance of liti-
gation. 1 2 Finally, the treatymakers believe that if there is to be a
change in the scope of domestic rights protections, it should be done
by legislation with the participation of the House of Representatives."I
At times, the Executive Branch and the Senate Foreign Relations
99 For the Senate's views, see INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, S. ExEc. REP. No. 103-29, at 6-7 (1994)
[hereinafter RACE CONVENTION REPORT]; ICCPR REPORT, supra note 95, at 10;
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30, at 12 (1990) [hereinafter
TORTURE CONVENTION REPORT]; GENOCIDE CONVENTION REPORT, supra note 89, at
15. For a representative administration view, see RACE CONVENTION REPORT, supra, at
33-34.
100 An important caveat should be noted here with respect to the Torture and
Genocide Conventions. For both conventions, the Senate insisted that the President
not ratify the treaty until Congress enacted legislation to bring U.S. domestic law into
compliance with the treaty. TORTURE CONVENTION REPORT, supra note 99, at 20;
GENOCIDE CONVENTION REPORT, supra note 89, at 26.
101 For a representative statement, see 1979 Hearings, supra note 80, at 54-55 (State
Department memorandum) ("The Covenants and U.S. statutes, while embodying al-
most identical rights, are not identical in wording. The purpose of the non-self-
executing declaration, therefore, is to prevent the subjection of fundamental rights to
differing and possibly confusing standards of protection in our courts.").
102 For example, the executive branch maintained that the ICCPR was in its en-
tirety non-self-executing by virtue of both Article 2(2), which provides that "each
State ... undertakes to take the necessary steps.., to adopt such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in this Covenant,"
and the ICCPR's official annotation, which provides that "the obligation to give effect
to the rights recognized in the covenant would be carried out by States through the
adoption of legislative or other measures." ICCPR, supra note 10, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173-
74; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 80, at 315 (memorandum of Roberts Owen, Legal Ad-
viser to the State Department). This view was challenged on the basis of other provi-
sions in the ICCPR. See, e.g., 1979 Hearings, supra note 80, at 276-77 (statement of Os-
car Schachter); id. at 287-88 (statement of Louis Henkin).
103 For example, in defending such a declaration before the ICCPR's Human
Rights Committee, the State Department explained that "the decision to make the
treaty 'non-self-executing' reflects a strong preference, both within the Administration
and in the Senate, not to use the unicameral treaty power of the U.S. Constitution to
effect direct changes in the domestic law of the United States." Press Release, State-
ment by Conrad K. Harper to the Human Rights Committee, USUN Press Release #49-
(95), at 3 (Mar. 29, 1995) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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Committee have stated that the non-self-execution declarations are
intended to clarify that the treaties will not create a private cause of
action in U.S. courts.' Relying on these statements, Professor David
Sloss has argued that, by negative implication, the U.S. treatymakers
intended for the human rights treaties to be applied by U.S. courts in
situations not requiring the creation of a private cause of action-for
example, as a defense to a criminal prosecution or in a civil suit in
which some other law provides a right to sue.' ° This is an unlikely in-
terpretation of the treatymakers' intent. As noted above, the treaty-
makers have repeatedly expressed concern about the litigation and
uncertainty that would result if the human rights treaties applied di-
rectly as U.S. law. °6 Moreover, on a number of occasions, the execu-
tive branch and the Senate have expressly stated that the non-self-
execution declarations would preclude all judicial enforcement of the
treaties."7 In this light, there is little basis for inferring that the
1-4 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Ex. C, 95-2): Hearing Before the Comm. of Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 103d Cong. 18
(1994) (testimony of State Department Legal Advisor Conrad Harper); Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong. 14 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Hearings];
RACE CONVENTION REPORT, supra note 99, at 25-26 (letter from Acting Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott); ICCPR REPORT, supra note 95, at 19.
1.6 David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing
Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 129 (1999).
:: See supra text accompanying notes 84, 101-02.
As noted above, this was the explanation given in the initial letter of submittal
to President Carter, and it was repeated by State Department officials during the 1979
hearings. 1979 Hearings, supra note 80, at 29 (testimony of Roberts B. Owen, Legal Ad-
viser to the Department of State) (explaining that the non-self-execution declarations
"mean that further changes in our laws will be brought about only through the normal
legislative process"); id. at 54 (response by the Department of State to a critique of the
reservations by the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights) ("A non-self-executing
treaty may be applied by our courts only through domestic laws implementing its pro-
visions."). It also was repeated in subsequent letters of submittal, reports from the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and statements in hearings. See, e.g., 1991 Hear-
ings, supra note 104, at 80 (written answers by Bush administration) (stating that non-
self-executing treaties do not "create directly enforceable rights absent implementing
legislation"); TORTURE CONVENTION REPORT, supra note 99, at 12 (explaining that the
non-self-execution declaration would "clarify that the provisions of the Convention
would not of themselves become effective as domestic law"); Marian Nash Leich, Con-
temporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Human Rights, 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 806, 807 (1988) ("With such a declaration, the provisions of the Convention
would not of themselves become effective as domestic law." (citing Memorandum from
Secretary of State George P. Shultz (May 10, 1988))); see also GENOCIDE CONVENTION
REPORT, supra note 89, at 26 (explaining that the declaration requiring that the Presi-
dent not deposit the instrument of ratification until after implementing legislation has
been enacted "reinforces the fact that the Convention is not self-executing," which
means that "no part of the Convention becomes law by itself').
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treatymakers intended human rights treaties to apply domestically
merely because they emphasized that the treaties did not create a pri-
vate cause of action. Not surprisingly, therefore, courts have con-
strued the non-self-execution declarations as precluding any judicial
enforcement of the treaties.
0 8
Federalism Understandings. RUDs for human rights treaties typically
contain an understanding or other statement relating to federalism.
The RUDs attached to the ICCPR, for example, provide that "the
United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by
the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and
judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise
by the state and local governments."'09 The Bush Administration ex-
plained that this understanding "serves to emphasize domestically that
there is no intent to alter the constitutional balance of authority be-
tween the State and Federal governments or to use the provisions of
the Covenant to 'federalize' matters now within the competence of
the States.""0 And the Clinton Administration similarly explained that
"[t]here is no disposition to preempt these state and local initiatives
or to federalize the entire range of anti-discriminatory actions
through the exercise of the constitutional treaty power.... In some
areas, it would be inappropriate to do so.""' The federalism under-
standings, in other words, both highlight and voice respect for the
United States's federal structure of government.
ICJ Reservations. U.S. RUDs, like the reservations of many other
nations, also typically decline to consent to "ICJ Clauses" in the hu-
man rights treaties, pursuant to which claims under the treaties could
be brought against the United States in the International Court ofJus-
tice.1 The United States attached a reservation to its ratification of
the Genocide Convention, for example, stating that "before any dis-
pute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the ju-
risdiction of the International Court of Justice under [Article IX of
the Convention], the specific consent of the United States is required
108 For several such decisions, see supra note 6.
109 U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 86, para. 11(5), at S8071.
11 ICCPR REPORT, supra note 95, at 18.
III RACE CONVENTION REPORT, supra note 99, at 24.
112 Like many nations, the United States is not currently a party to the general
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice. It withdrew its consent to
that jurisdiction in 1985, after the court held that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims brought by Nicaragua concerning alleged military activities conducted by the
United States. BARRY E. CARTER & PHaLLI' R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 326 (3d
ed. 1999).
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in each case.""3 The U.S. treatymakers have explained that the ICJ
reservations are designed "to retain the ability of the United States to
decline a case which may be brought for frivolous or political rea-
sons.""" They also have expressed the view that the reservations will
not significantly affect the resolution of disputes under the treaties
"because the [ICJ] has not played an important implementation role
and because the Convention provides other effective means ... for
dispute settlement."""
RUDs are now standard practice for U.S. treatymakers when ratify-
ing human rights treaties. Their validity has been challenged, how-
ever, under both international law and U.S. domestic law. We con-
sider the international law objections first.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Many scholars have argued that RUDs are inconsistent with the in-
ternational law that governs treatymaking. In this Part, we explain
why these objections are questionable on their own terms. We also
explain why the conclusion usually drawn from the objections-that
the United States is bound by the human rights treaties as if it had
never attached the RUDs-is inconsistent with fundamental interna-
tional law principles relating to state consent. This Part is addressed
primarily to international lawyers and is somewhat technical in nature;
generalist readers may wish to skip ahead to Part III, in which we dis-
cuss the domestic law objections to the RUDs.
We need to say a word at the outset about the sources of interna-
tional law relevant to this issue. The Vienna Convention on the Law
11 U.S. RUDs to Genocide Convention, supra note 86, para. I(1), at S1377; see also
U.S. RUDs to Race Convention, supra note 86, para. 1(3), at S14326 (stating that "spe-
cific consent of the United States is required" before any dispute may be submitted to
the jurisdiction of the ICJ); U.S. RUDs to Torture Convention, supra note 86, para.
1(2), at S17491 (reserving the right to agree to any procedure for arbitration). The
ICCPR does not contain an ICJ Clause.
114 RACE CONVENIION REPORT, supra note 99, at 8.
II Id. There is relatively little controversy regarding the validity of the United
States's ICJ reservations. Indeed, the ICJ itself recently gave effect to one of these res-
ervations. In dismissing an action brought by Yugoslavia against the United States for
alleged genocide in connection with the Kosovo conflict, the Court noted that "the
Genocide Convention does not prohibit reservations" and that "Yugoslavia did not ob-
ject to the United States reservation." Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force
(Yugoslavia v. United States), 1999 I.C.J. 114, 1 24 (June 2), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iyus/iyusframe.htm. As a result, the Court concluded that
"the said reservation had the effect of excluding [the ICJ Clause] from the provisions
of the Convention in force between the Parties." Id.
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of Treaties'1 6 is the primary source of the international law objections
to RUDs. Unfortunately, the provisions of the Vienna Convention re-
lating to reservations are vaguely worded and have provoked dis-
agreement among commentators and inconsistent national interpre-
tations.17 To make matters more uncertain, the United States has not
even ratified the Vienna Convention. Many commentators believe
that the Convention's terms are nonetheless fully binding on the
United States as customary international law, which is the body of in-
ternational law that "results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.""8 While this
claim is almost certainly too broad,"" we will assume for present pur-
poses, as have executive branch officials, that the Convention generally
reflects customary international law.1
2 °
We now turn to the specific international law arguments made
against the RUDs. Where examples are needed, we will refer to the
RUDs attached to the U.S. ratification of the ICCPR, which have re-
ceived the most attention and criticism.
116 Vienna Convention, supra note 22, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 331.
17 See Catherine J. Redgwell, Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee
General Comment No. 24(52), 46 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 390 (1997) [hereinafter Redgwell,
Reservations]; Catherine Redgwell, Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations
to General Multilateral Treaties, 64 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 245 (1993) [hereinafter Redgwell,
Universality].
18 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987).
119 Many provisions of the Vienna Convention, including the articles on reserva-
dons, did not reflect customary international law at the time the treaty was drafted. See
IAN SINcLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATIES 10-24 (2d ed. 1984).
Moreover, the criteria for inferring customary international law binding on the United
States from a nonratified treaty like the Vienna Convention are contested. See, e.g.,
Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens,
and General Principles, 12 AUSM. Y.B. INT'L L. 82 (1992). Finally, well settled U.S. prac-
tice departs from some provisions of the Vienna Convention, most notably its provi-
sions governing treaty interpretation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 cmt. g (1987); DavidJ. Bederman, Reviv-
alist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 972 (1994). As noted below,
a customary international law rule does not bind nations that have opted out of the
rule during its formative stage. See infra note 124.
120 The typical executive branch formulation, as reflected in the Government's
brief in the Domingues case, is that the Vienna Convention "is generally considered to
be consistent with current treaty law and practice as recognized in the United States."
Domingues Brief, supra note 13, at 8 n.3; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES pt. III, introductory note (1987);
Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts,
28 VA.J. INT'L L. 281, 298-99 (1988).
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A. Three Minor Arguments
We begin with three prevalent, but relatively non-serious, interna-
tional law arguments. The first is that the RUDs are invalid under Ar-
ticle 27 of the Vienna Convention because they, in effect, limit U.S.
treaty obligations to the existing requirements of domestic U.S. law.
121
Article 27 provides that a nation cannot "invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."22 As this
language makes clear, Article 27 prohibits reliance on domestic law as
an excuse for nonperformance of a treaty obligation. It says nothing
about reliance on domestic law as a justification for not consenting to
a treaty obligation in the first place. By its terms, then, Article 27 has
no bearing on the validity of RUDs, which do not claim any right of
nonperformance by the United States with respect to treaty provisions
that it has ratified.
The second argument-which concerns the relationship between
the RUDs and customary international law-is more complicated, but
no more persuasive. This argument consists of two claims: first, that
the treaty provisions with respect to which the United States has
adopted reservations are already binding on the United States as a
matter of customary international law; and, second, that it is not per-
missible for a nation to agree to a treaty but opt out of provisions that
are already binding on that nation under customary international
law.' 23 Neither claim is sound. As an initial matter, it is unlikely that
the provisions of the ICCPR with respect to which the United States
has attached reservations reflect binding customary international law.
To take what is probably the strongest example invoked by academic
critics of RUDs, even if there is sufficient state practice to support a
LA Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 627; Schabas, supra note 4, at 278 & n.35;
Weissbrodt supra note 4, at 57. A related argument is that no reservations are allowed
with respect to the "non-derogable" provisions in the treaties. This argument is a non
sequitur. The ICCPR does state that some of its provisions are non-derogable-that is,
that these provisions may not be disregarded even in time of emergency. ICCPR, supra
note 10, art. 4(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. That statement, however, simply describes the
binding effect of the provisions once adopted. There is nothing in the ICCPR, or in
the concept of non-derogability, that requires nations to agree to particular treaty pro-
visions in the first place. Cf ICCPR Human Rights Comm., General Comment 24(52),
52d Sess., 1382d mtg. 1 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) [hereinafter
General Comment 24(52)] (noting that "there is no automatic correlation between
reservations to non-derogable provisions, and reservations which offend against the
object and purpose of the Covenant").
i-1 Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339 (emphasis
added).
12- See General Comment 24(52), supra note 121, 18; Schabas, supra note 4, at 308.
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customary international law ban on executing juvenile offenders, it is
likely that the United States has effectively opted out of any such cus-
tomary international law norm.14
More importantly, the argument incorrectly assumes that nations
are obligated, when they ratify a treaty, to accept all terms in the treaty
that reflect customary international law. There is no basis in interna-
tional law for such a rule. A nation's attachment of a reservation to a
treaty provision is not itself a violation of the provision. It is simply a
decision by the nation making the reservation not to bind itself to the
treaty regime, and its associated enforcement procedures, with respect to
the provision in question. No one claims that nations have an inter-
national law obligation to bind themselves to such treaty regimes and
procedures in the first instance. It is not argued, for example, that the
United States would have violated customary international law if it had
declined to ratify the ICCPR altogether. Nor is it argued that the
United States is in violation of international law for having declined to
ratify the Vienna Convention, even though there is widespread
agreement that at least some of its terms reflect customary interna-
tional law. Since it is clear that nations can refuse to ratify a treaty
with terms that are reflective of customary international law, it is diffi-
cult to understand how or why international law would obligate them,
when they do ratify the treaty, to accept the treaty in its entirety.
Moreover, such a requirement would have undesirable conse-
quences for treatymaking. Given the amorphous nature of customary
international law, it will often be difficult for nations to know, when
124 It is well settled that a nation "that has clearly declared its rejection of a norm or
principle of international law while it was in the process of development is not bound
by it." HENKIN, supra note 51, at 30; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmL d (1987) (explaining that "a state
that indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of develop-
ment is not bound by that rule even after it matures"); Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the
Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 457 (1985) (describing the increasingly important role of persistent objec-
tors in international controversies). The United States-in its RUDs, communications
with international organizations (such as the ICCPR's Human Rights Committee and
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights), and other state practices--has
clearly declared its rejection of any international law norm outlawing the death penalty
for juvenile offenders. See Domingues Brief, supra note 13, at 12-14 (detailing various
U.S. objections to such a rule of international law). Numerous commentators have
nonetheless argued that the execution of juvenile offenders in the United States vio-
lates customary international law. See, e.g., Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment:
The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalt), 52
U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983); Nanda, supra note 4; David Weissbrodt, Execution ofJuvenile
Offenders by the United States Violates International Human Rights Law, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POLY 339 (1988).
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they ratify a treaty, whether a particular provision is reflective of cus-
tomary international law.' 2' A rule that outlawed reservations to all
treaty terms reflective of customary international law would thus cre-
ate substantial uncertainty about the validity of treaty reservations and,
more broadly, about the status of treaty relationships.
The third argument is that RUDs are improper because they are
an attempt by the United States to ratify the treaties without undertak-
ing any obligations. As Professor Henkin explains, "[b]y adhering to
human rights conventions subject to these reservations, the United
States, it is charged, is pretending to assume international obligations
but in fact is undertaking nothing."'2 6 It is not clear exactly what the
legal claim is here. The claim cannot be that the United States has
pledged insufficient "consideration" in entering into these treaty
commitments, since it is well settled that, unlike U.S. contract law, the
international law governing treaties does not require consideration.
' 27
Perhaps the claim is simply that RUDs violate a general duty under in-
ternational law to act in good faith. There is indeed an international
law principle relating to good faith in the treaty context-pacta sunt
sevmnda. That principle, however, simply requires that nations act in
good faith in complying with the treaty obligations they have ac-
cepted.k'  The pacta sunt servanda principle does not entail any duty by
nations to agree to treaty obligations in the first place.
Moreover, whatever its international law basis, the premise of this
third argument-that the United States has not assumed any interna-
tional obligations under the human rights treaties-is false. For some
treaties, most notably the Genocide and Torture Conventions, the
United States has expressly changed its domestic law in order to com-
1.17 See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815, 838-41 (1997);
Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist liew of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV.
665 (1986).
" Henkin, supra note 4, at 344; see also, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 1179 ("This
duality of legal standards places the commitment of the United States to the interna-
tional rule of law in serious question.").
12 7 SeeVienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 2(1) (a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333 (defin-
ing "treaty" simply as a written "international agreement" governed by international
law); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24
YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 30 (1999) ("[T]here is no corresponding requirement [under treaty
law] for consideration."); Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 781,
797 (1994) ("There has never been a doctrine of consideration in treaty law....").
UN See Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S at 339 ("Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith." (emphasis added)).
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ply with the treaty obligations. 129  For other treaties, such as the
ICCPR, the United States has maintained that its current human
lights protections satisfy its treaty obligations and has committed itself
not to retreat from those protections. In doing so, the United States has
exposed itself to the argument that its current law does not fully satisfy
its treaty obligations, an argument that would not be available if the
United States had not made any international commitments. The
United States also has committed itself to submit reports detailing its
compliance with the treaties, and it has submitted a number of such
reports. 130 Its reports have in turn served as a focal point for argu-
ments concerning U.S. compliance with the treaty obligations.!"
129 The United States enacted criminal legislation to implement both the Genocide
Convention and the Torture Convention. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1994) (genocide); 18
U.S.C. § 2340A (1994) (torture). In addition, it enacted a broad civil damages remedy
for victims of torture to "carry out obligations of the United States under the United
Nations Charter and other international agreements pertaining to the protection of
human rights." Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.
73 (1992). In 1998, it changed its immigration law to take account of Article 3 of the
Torture Convention, which bars the return of a person to another nation "where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture." United States Policy with Respect to Involuntary Return of Persons in Danger
of Subjection to Torture, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (Supp. IV 1998). Moreover, the Clinton
Administration recently issued an executive order designed to promote executive
branch compliance with the various human rights treaties. Exec. Order No. 13,107,
3 C.F.R. 234 (1999).
130 Of the four major human rights treaties ratified by the United States, three (the
ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Race Convention) have reporting require-
ments. The United States has submitted reports to the monitoring bodies associated
with each of these three treaties. See United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Treaty Bodies Database, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. Like many nations,
the United States has not submitted every report that has been due and has not always
submitted its reports on time. As ofJuly 21, 2000, the United States had submitted a
total of eleven reports, and five were overdue-a better reporting record than that of
many other nations. Id.
For example, these reports have resulted in arguments, by the relevant human
rights committees as well as by private groups such as Amnesty International and Hu-
man Rights Watch, that aspects of the U.S. death penalty, certain U.S. prison condi-
tions, and U.S. police practices violate treaty obligations. See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, U.S.
Prisoner Restraints Amount to Torture, Geneva Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2000, at A12
(detailing U.N. objections to the use of electric stun belts and restraint chairs as viola-
tions of the international treaty against torture); Amnesty International, Annual Report
2000, http://www.amnesty.org (objecting to the use of the death penalty for minors,
police brutality, and ill-treatment in prisons); Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000,
http://www.hrw.org/vr2k (citing practices such as police abuse, overincarceration,
conditions in custody, and gay- and lesbian-rights violations).
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B. The "Object and Purpose"Argument
We now turn to the argument that the U.S. reservations to the
ICCPR violate the treaty's "object and purpose" and are therefore in-
valid under Article 19 of the Vienna Convention. 32 As we explain be-
low, this argument is difficult to evaluate but probably is incorrect.
The conclusion usually drawn from the argument is that the United
States should be bound by all of the provisions of the ICCPR, including
provisions to which the RUDs expressly declined consent. As we explain,
there is no basis in international law for this conclusion.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth noting that the
ICCPR's Human Rights Committee has embraced both the above
premise and conclusion. The Committee has no official power to re-
solve disputes or issue binding legal interpretations. It is instead
charged with receiving reports submitted by nations under the
ICCPR's self-reporting provisions and issuing "such general comments
as it may consider appropriate." 3 Nevertheless, it has declared itself
to be the definitive interpreter of whether or not a reservation to the
ICCPR satisfies the object and purpose test.'" And, in two documents,
it has directly or indirectly raised questions about the validity of the
U.S. RUDs. In 1994, it issued a general comment concerning reserva-
tions to the ICCPR, in which it expressed "particular concern" about
"widely formulated reservations which essentially render ineffective all
Covenant rights which would require any change in national law to
ensure compliance with Covenant obligations." 5 It also maintained
D., See, e.g., Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 599-603; Schabas, supra note 4, at
285-96; Weissbrodt, supra note 4, at 58. See generay General Comment 24(52), supra
note 121 (laying out a framework for assessing reservations to the ICCPR). Article 19
of the Vienna Convention states in relevant part that reservations to a treaty are not
allowed if they are "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty." Vienna
Convention, supra note 22, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
i'i' ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 40(4), 999 U.N.T.S at 182. Under Article 41 of the
ICCPR, nations may submit declarations agreeing to have the Committee "receive and
consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party
is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant." Id. art. 41(1), 999
U.N.T.S. at 182. In addition, nations that have ratified the First Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR have agreed to have the Committee "receive and consider communications
from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that
State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant." Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
art.1, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). The United States has
neither submitted a declaration under Article 41 nor ratified the First Optional Proto-
col.
General Comment 24 (52), supra note 121,1 18.
i Id. 1 12.
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in that comment that reservations incompatible with the object and
purpose of the ICCPR normally should be treated as severable, mean-
ing that the treaty "will be operative for the reserving party without
the benefit of the reservation."'6 Then, in 1995, it issued a comment
specifically on U.S. human rights practices, in which it asserted, with-
out analysis, that the U.S. reservations with respect to the death pen-
alty violated the "object and purpose" of the ICCPR. ' 3' In short, the
Human Rights Committee has effectively taken the position that the
United States is bound by the ICCPR's death penalty provisions under
international law even though it specifically declined to consent to
them.
To analyze the Committee's claim, some background is necessary.
Nations have made reservations to treaties since the end of the eight-
eenth century. 's International law traditionally imposed strict re-
quirements on when a state could make a reservation and still be a
party to a treaty. In a bilateral treaty, a reservation was like a counter-
offer; both parties to the treaty had to agree to every reservation be-
fore the treaty became valid. For multilateral treaties, the traditional
rule was that a reserving state was not a party to a treaty unless every
other party to the treaty accepted the reservation."9 This traditional
unanimity rule was:
based on the concept of the integrity of the terms of a treaty which had
been freely negotiated by the prospective parties, and it provided an un-
136 Id. 18.
137 Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Comments of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee, 53d Sess., 1413th mtg. 1 14, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995). Several U.S. officials defended the U.S. RUDs regarding
the death penalty in hearings before the Committee held in late March 1995. See
ICCPR Human Rights Committee, Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting, 53d Sess., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405 (1995) (Mar. 31, 1995 hearings); ICCPR Human Rights Com-
mittee, Summary Record of the 1401st Meeting, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401
(1995) (Mar. 29, 1995 hearings).
138 The Senate's reservation to the Jay Treaty in 1794 was the first reservation to a
bilateral treaty; Sweden-Norway's reservation to certain parts of the Act of the Congress
of Vienna in 1815 was one of the first reservations to a multilateral treaty. William W.
Bishop, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 2 RECUEIL DES CouRs 249, 260-62 (1961). Reserva-
tions were "sporadic" during the nineteenth century, but then picked up significantly
at the dawn of the twentieth century, beginning with the many reservations to the 1899
and 1907 Hague Conventions on the laws of war. FRANK HORN, RESERVATIONS AND
INTERPRETIVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES 7 (1988). For statistics on
the use of reservations from 1919 to 1971, see John King Gamble, Jr., Reservations to
Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372, 376-83
(1980).
139 SINCLAIR, supra note 119, at 54-56; Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,
arts. 14-16, reprinted in 29 AM.J. INT'L L. 657, 659-60 (Supp. 1935).
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ambiguous answer to the question whether a State which had submitted
an instrument of ratification or accession, accompanied by a reservation,
had become a party to the treaty generally."
With the expansion of multilateral treatymaking after World War
II, the unanimity rule came under attack.41 There were increasing
concerns that the unanimity rule was insufficiently flexible and that it
thwarted maximum participation in multilateral treaties, especially
human rights treaties. Such flexibility was thought to be essential for
the making of human rights treaties among an increasingly large
number of countries that were politically and culturally diverse. The
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") embraced a more flexible ap-
proach in its 1951 advisory opinion in Reservations to the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.43 The ICJ rea-
soned that the aim of securing widespread ratification of the Geno-
cide Convention argued for greater flexibility with regard to reserva-
tions. It explained that, with respect to such a treaty, "one cannot
speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the
maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and du-
ties."'4' The ICJ therefore held that a reserving state could be a party
to the Genocide Convention even if some parties to the Convention
objected to the reservation. The ICJ stated, however, that if a state
makes a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Genocide Convention, the state "cannot be regarded as being a party
to the Convention." 4
40 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: FIRST SESSION,
VIENNA, 26 MARCH-24 MAY 1968, at 113, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/1 1, U.N. Sales No. E.
68.v.7 (1969) [hereinafter U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES] (Testimony of
Mr. Sinclair); see also Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
[1951] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 123, 129, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1 (stat-
ing that the unanimity rule is "desirable" for maintaining "uniformity in the obliga-
tions of all the parties to a multilateral convention").
141 Some movement away from the unanimity rle occurred prior to World War II.
Most notably, a more flexible approach to conditions was adopted in connection with
the Pan American Union of the 1930s. See P.K. MENON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF TREATIES 34-35 (1992).
142 For example, the representative at the Vienna Conference from the United
Kingdom, a nation that traditionally supported the unanimity rule, acknowledged that
the rule "might in modem times be a counsel of perfection, since it had been ren-
dered less practicable by the great expansion of the membership of the international
community in recent years." UNTED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW. OF TREATIES,
supra note 140, at 114.
14 1951 I.C.J. 15. The case came to the court at the request of the United Nations
General Assembly.
14 Id. at 23.
145 Id. at 29.
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The Vienna Convention, which was opened for signature in 1969
and entered into force in 1980, embraced a flexible approach to res-
ervations similar to the one outlined in the Genocide Convention deci-
sion.1 Article 19 of the Convention allows a party to formulate a res-
ervation to a treaty unless "the reservation is incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty." 47 Articles 20 and 21 then establish
rules for acceptance or rejection of reservations, and the conse-
quences that follow from acceptance or rejection. When a contract-
ing nation accepts another nation's reservation, the reserving nation
becomes a party to the treaty in relation to the accepting nation. 4" A
reservation is deemed accepted by any nation that does not raise an
objection to the reservation within twelve months of notification or by
the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty,
whichever is later.49 An objection to a reservation does not preclude
entry into force of the treaty between the reserving and objecting na-
tion unless the objecting state says so definitively;'1° rather, the provi-
sion to which the reservation relates is simply inapplicable between.• 151
the two nations to the extent of the reservation. This flexible ap-
proach, as the United Nations's International Law Commission has
explained, is designed to encourage widespread participation in treaty
regimes."'
Neither the Vienna Convention nor the Genocide Convention deci-
sion provides much guidance regarding the meaning of the "object
and purpose" test. The ICJ stated in the Genocide Convention case that
a central purpose of the Genocide Convention is that "as many States
146 For a detailed historical account of the events between the Genocide Convention
case and the final wording of the Vienna Convention, including the initial criticism of
the ICJ decision and the eventual acceptance over the subsequent twenty years that a
more flexible approach was appropriate, see Redgwell, Universality, supra note 117, at
250-63.
147 Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337. Article 19 also
states that reservations are permitted unless the treaty prohibits them or only author-
izes reservations other than the ones made. Id.
148 Id. art. 20(4) (a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
149 Id. am 20(5), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.50 Id. art. 20(4)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
5 Id. art. 21 (3), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
152 The International Law Commission, in its comments on the draft terms of the
Vienna Convention, explained that "a power to formulate reservations must in the na-
ture of things tend to make it easier for some States to execute the act necessary to
bind themselves finally to participating in the treaty and therefore tend to promote a
greater measure of universality in the application of the treaty." Report of the Commission
to the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 169, 205, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1.
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as possible should participate. " '53 This statement, combined with the
court's holding, supports a flexible approach to reservations to human
rights treaties, but it provides little guidance regarding specific appli-
cations of the "object and purpose" test. To make matters more un-
certain, there has been no subsequent judicial analysis of the test un-
der either the Vienna Convention or customary international law, and
no binding official determination that a reservation has ever violated
the test.
Despite these considerations, it seems unlikely that the U.S. RUDs
violate the human rights treaties' "object and purpose." We base this
conclusion in part on the widespread state practice in support of res-
ervations to human rights treaties. For example, approximately one-
third of the parties to the ICCPR made reservations to over a dozen
substantive provisions."4 Like the United States, many countries con-
ditioned their consent to the treaty in order to conform the treaty ob-
ligations to their domestic laws.k' France, for example, entered reser-
vations and declarations ensuring that its ICCPR obligations were no
more demanding than its domestic law with respect to presidential
power, military discipline, immigration, appellate criminal review,
regulation of war propaganda, and minority rights. Belgium condi-
tioned its consent to ensure that the ICCPR did not affect its domestic
law with respect to sex discrimination in the exercise of royal powers,
the protection of juvenile criminal offenders, various criminal proce-
dures, freedom of speech, and marriage. The United Kingdom gave
its consent on the condition that its domestic law not be affected with
respect to free legal assistance, spousal equality, election law, military
"' Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.CJ. 15, 24. The ICJ continued: "The complete exclusion
from the Convention of one or more States would not only restrict the scope of appli-
cation, but would detract from the authority of the moral and humanitarian principles
which are its basis." Id. The Human Rights Committee has described the object and
purpose of the ICCPR in a similarly general way. See General Comment 24(52), supra
note 121,17.
The object and purpose of the Covenant is to create legally binding standards
for human rights by defining certain civil and political rights and placing
them in a framework of obligations which are legally binding for those States
which ratify; and to provide an efficacious supervisory machinery for the obli-
gations undertaken.
Id.
4 Redgwell, Reservations, supra note 117, at 393.
'1 The information in this paragraph is drawn from the online United Nations
Treat), Collection, specifically the Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partI/chapterV/treaty5.asp [hereinafter Status of Multilateral Treaties].
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discipline, and immigration. There are many other examples. As one
commentator noted, the ICCPR "has... been the object of some
sweeping reservations to which few objections have been made."'6
Furthermore, other human rights treaties, such as the Convention on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, are even more "afflicted" by reserva-
tions."' 7
This state practice suggests that the United States's reservations to
the human rights treaties, which were not substantially different in
number or scope from those of other nations, do not violate the ob-
ject and purpose of the treaties. The selective and specific nature of
the U.S. reservations further supports this conclusion. Consider the
ICCPR, which protects dozens of rights, none of which is specified to
be central to the treaty's purpose. When a treaty protects manifold
rights and declines to prohibit reservations, it is difficult to conclude
that reservations to a few of the treaty's rights violate its object and158
purpose. By contrast, the Genocide and Torture Conventions are
both designed to protect a single, overwhelmingly important right. If
the United States had ratified those treaties while reserving the right
to commit genocide or torture, the reservations might wel have vio-
lated the treaties' object and purpose, for little would remain of the
obligations under the treaty.'5 9 This, of course, is not what happened.
The United States accepted the prohibitions on genocide and torture
and simply attempted, through its RUDs, to clarify the scope of the
terms to which it was consenting.' 6°
Several technical legal arguments under the Vienna Convention
also support the conclusion that U.S. reservations do not violate the
object and purpose of the ICCPR. Unlike other human rights treaties,
including one of the optional protocols to the ICCPR (which the
United States has not ratified), the ICCPR contains no clause exclud-
ing reservations and no reference to the object and purpose test.
Only 11 of the 146 nations that are parties to the ICCPR have objected
to the U.S. RUDs, all on the ground that the reservations violated the
56 Redgwell, Reservations, supra note 117, at 391.
57 Id.
158 Cf Madeline Morris, Few Reservations About Reservations, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 341,
343 (2000) ("There is a difference between frustrating the purposes of a treaty and
fulfilling some, but not all, of its purposes.").
159 SeeANTHONYAUST, MODERN TREATYLAWAND PRAcTcIC 110-11 (2000).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
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object and purpose of the treaty. 6' None of these objections came
"within the twelve months of communication of the U.S. reserva-
tions."" Under the terms of the Vienna Convention, therefore, the
U.S. reservations are deemed accepted. 1  In addition, none of the na-
tions that objected to the reservations claimed that the United States
was not a party to the treaty. Under the Vienna Convention, then, the
United States is, at worst, a party to the treaty and the provisions to
which the reservations relate do not apply between the United States
and the objecting nations.64
Some commentators have responded to these latter points by ar-
guing that other nations do not have the power under international
law to consent to reservations that violate the object and purpose of a
treaty. The Genocide Convention decision does offer some support for
this argument. The Vienna Convention, which supersedes the state-
ment of customary international law in the Genocide Convention deci-
sion, is unclear about whether the rules for acceptance of reservations
in Article 20 apply to all reservations, or only to ones that survive Arti-
cle 19's object and purpose test.,' Both the Vienna Convention's
I'd Status of Multilateral Treaties, supra note 155. Twelve of the 132 countries that
are parties to the Genocide Convention have objected to the U.S. RUDs, 3 of the 119
countries that are parties to the Torture Convention have objected to the U.S. RUDs,
and none of the 156 countries that are parties to the Race Convention has objected to
the U.S. RUDs. Id. Compare those numbers with the test set forth in the Race Con-
vention, whereby a reservation will be deemed "incompatible" with the object and
purpose of the Convention if two-thirds of the parties object to the reservation. Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 20th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 58, art. 20(2), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2106 (1966), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 350, 365 (1966). There have been no specific
objections to the United States's non-self-execution declarations in connection with
any of the treaties. Status of Multilateral Treaties, supra note 155.
Redgwell, Reservations, supra note 117, at 395.
" See Nienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 20(5), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
("[U]nless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been ac-
cepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a
period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which
it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.").
" See Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 20(4)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337
("[A]n objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the
entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a
contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State."); id. art. 21(3), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 337 ("When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry
into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which
the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the res-
ervation.").
"' For the International Law Commission's commentary on the original draft ver-
sion of Articles 19 and 20, suggesting that the object and purpose test is not an inde-
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drafting history and the state practice under the Convention suggest
that Article 20 applies to all reservations, and thus that the object and
purpose test is not an independent bar to other nations' acceptance
of reservations under the Vienna Convention.' 6 The Human Rights
Committee appears to agree with this reading of the Convention be-
cause, in explaining why the failure by nations to object to reserva-
tions to the ICCPR did not constitute an acceptance of the reserva-
tions, it felt compelled to maintain that the Vienna Convention's rules
about tacit consent to reservations "are inappropriate to address the
problem of reservations to human rights treaties."6 7 These factors,
taken together, suggest that the best reading of the Vienna Conven-
tion and related customary international law is that other nations have
effectively consented to the validity of the U.S. reservations to the
ICCPRt 68
Because of ambiguities in the Vienna Convention, and the lack of
a centralized decisionmaker with authority to determine the validity of
reservations, there is room for disagreement with this conclusion con-
cerning tacit acceptance."" This fact is probably beside the point be-
cause, as discussed above, the U.S. reservations almost certainly do not
violate the ICCPR's object and purpose. But even if one concluded
that the United States's RUDs did violate the object and purpose test
and that the violations were not cured by other nations' failure to ob-
ject to them, it is clearly incorrect to conclude, as the ICCPR's Human
Rights Committee and others have, that the United States continues
to be bound by the ICCPR, including ICCPR terns to which it did not con-
sent. ° One of the most established principles in international law is
pendent barrier to reservation acceptance by other nations, see U.N. CONFERENCE ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 140. In subsequent negotiations, many nations pro-
posed amendments to the Vienna Convention to clarify that the object and purpose
test was an absolute bar to reservations, but these amendments were all rejected. See
Redgwell, Universality, supra note 117, at 257-60.
On the drafting history of the Vienna Convention and state practice concerning
reservations, see Redgwell, Universality, supra note 117, at 273-78.
167 General Comment 24(52), supra note 121,1 17.
16 At the very least, the drafting history of the Vienna Convention, as well as sub-
sequent state practice, suggest that as a matter of customay international law arising from
the Vienna Convention, the object and purpose test is not a bar to reservations inde-
pendent of a nation's consent to the reservations.
169 This issue is more complex than our already complicated discussion suggests.
For an overview of the debate regarding the legal effect of reservations that are incom-
patible with the object and purpose of a treaty, see AUST, supra note 159, at 105-30;
Red gwell, Universality, supra note 117, at 263-69.
See General Comment 24(52), supra note 121, 1 18 (concluding that a reserva-
tion that violates the object and purpose test "will generally be severable, in the sense
that the Covenant will be operative for the [United States] without benefit of the res-
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that "in treaty relations a state cannot be bound without its consent."''
It would contravene this fundamental principle of international law to
invalidate a reservation to a treaty but hold the party to the remainder
of the treaty without recognizing the reservation" This conclusion is
especially clear where, as with the U.S. ratification of the ICCPR, the
reservations are "integral parts of its consent to be bound."'" The
United Nations's International Law Commission recently confirmed
this conclusion and (along with several individual nations) expressly
rejected the contrary views of the ICCPR's Human Rights Commit-
tee.1
74
At first glance, it might appear that two decisions from the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights support the Committee's views. In these
decisions, the European Court held that reservations to the European
Convention on Human Rights were invalid, and it enforced the entire
enation").
171 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28); see also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FoREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES pt. I, introductory note at 18
(1987) ("Modern international law is rooted in acceptance by states which constitute
the system."); Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 34, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341 ("A
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its con-
sent."); LOuIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAw: POLITICS AND VALUES 28 (1995) ("For
treaties, consent is essential. No treaty, old or new, whatever its character or subject, is
binding on a state unless it has consented to it.").
" See Redgwell, Universality, supra note 117, at 267 ("It was never the intention of
the ICJ, the ILC or the [Vienna Convention] that a State should be bound by a provi-
sion to which it had not indicated its consent.").
17- Observations by the United States on General Comment 24, 3 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP.
265, 269 (1996) [hereinafter U.S. Response]; cf Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.),
1957 I.C.J. 9, 66 (July 6) (separate opinion ofJudge Lauterpacht) (arguing that when
an invalid reservation is an essential component of a nation's consent to the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, that nation's entire consent is
"devoid of legal effect").
171 The United States, Great Britain, and France strongly objected to the dews of
the ICCPR's Human Rights Committee expressed in General Comment 24(52), in-
cluding its views concerning the proper remedy for invalid reservations. Observations by
France on General Comment 24 on Reservations to the ICCPR 4 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP. 6, 6-8
(1997); Observations by the United Kingdom on General Comment 24, 3 INT'L HUM. RTS.
REP. 261, 261-69 (1996); U.S. Response, supra note 173, at 265-69. In a 1997 report, the
United Nations's International Law Commission similarly rejected a number of the
conclusions in General Comment 24(52). Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of its Forty-Ninth Session, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc.
A/52/10 (1997). The tension between General Comment 24(52) and the require-
ment of state consent ivas exacerbated recently when the Human Rights Committee
concluded that parties to the ICCPR do not have the right to withdraw from that
treaty. General Comment 26, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., Supp. No. 40,
1 5, U.N. Doc. A/53/40 (1998).
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treaty, including the terms to which reservations were taken.Y5 These
decisions, however, have little relevance to the U.S. reservations to the
ICCPR and other global human rights treaties. In part, this is because
the decisions were premised on a finding that the countries intended
to be bound by the European Convention regardless of the fate of
their reservations.17 By contrast, the U.S. RUDs were clearly a condi-
tion of U.S. ratification. More significantly, the European Court was
"not simply applying general principles of treaty law." 78 Instead, it was
interpreting the particular provisions of the European Convention in
light of the Convention's role as a "constitutional instrument of Euro-
pean public order (ordre public) ., ' 179 These principles do not apply be-
yond Europe and thus cannot supersede the controlling principles of
the Vienna Convention and related customary international law.
In sum, if the U.S. RUDs really do violate the object and purpose
of the human rights treaties, and the acquiescence of the other parties
to the treaties has not rectified this problem, there are only two possi-
ble remedies under international law: either the United States is not a
party to the treaty provisions with respect to which it has reserved
(which yields the same result as if the RUDs were enforced), or the
United States is not a party to the treaty at all."'0 Human rights advo-
cates have argued against the former possibility but they have not, of
175 See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Belilos v. Switzerland,
132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987).
176 In the Belilos case, Switzerland explicitly conceded this point 132 Eur. C. H.R.
at 28; Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Doc. Cour/Misc (87)
237, 45 (transcript of public hearing, Oct 26, 1987). See generally Schabas, supra note 4,
at 319. In the Loizidou case, by contrast, the court inferred this intent. 310 Eur. Cr.
H.RP at 28; see Schabas, supra note 4, at 321; see also Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24:
Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 17 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L.
277, 302-06 (1999).
177 See supra Part I.B and text accompanying note 86.
178 Redgwell, Universality, supra note 117, at 266; see also Susan Marks, Reservations
Unhinged: The Belilos Case Before the European Court of Human Rights, 39 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 300, 327 (1990) (analyzing the Belilos decision and tying it to "structural features
of the [European] Convention").
179 Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27.
180 By analogy, these are the two possibilities generally available under U.S. law with
respect to the severability of statutory provisions. If a court finds a portion of a statute
to be invalid, it will generally try to sever the invalid portion and enforce the remain-
der. However, if it determines that the statute would not have been enacted in the ab-
sence of the invalid portion, it will decline to enforce the statute as a whole. See, e.g.,
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652-55 (1984) (plurality opinion); Champlin Ref.
Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). See generallyJohn Copeland
Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993) (tracing the development ofjudicial tests
for determining when a statute should be found severable).
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course, argued in favor of the latter.
In the early stages of the international human rights movement,
flexibility regarding reservations was viewed as necessary to achieve
widespread ratification of human rights treaties. Now that this goal
has been achieved, human rights advocates have changed their posi-
tion, attacking the RUDs on the ground that the flexible approach to
reservations adopted in the Vienna Convention is "inappropriate" for
human rights treaties. Even more dramatically, it is claimed that na-
tions can be bound by the very treaty terms to which they declined to
consent. This change of position by the human rights community
may reflect an understandable effort to strengthen international hu-
man rights law, but it is inconsistent with settled principles of interna-
tional law. 8'
III. DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In the last Part, we explained why the U.S. RUDs are consistent
with customary international law principles of treaty formation. Even
if the international law objections to the RUDs were more persuasive,
however, they would not provide a basis for invalidating the RUDs in
U.S. courts. In a variety of circumstances, U.S. courts give effect to ac-
tions by political branch actors even if those actions violate interna-
tional law. For example, they apply a federal statute even if it violates
customary international law182 and even if it conflicts with an earlier
inconsistent treaty.'83 Similarly, they uphold executive branch actions
that violate customary international law."" In these and many other
INI In Part IV below, we discuss how the change of position may also have undesir-
ablepolicy consequences for the development of international human rights law.
' See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090-91 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446,
1453-54 (11th Cir. 1986).
1 3 See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whit-
ney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Edye N% Robertson (The Head Money
Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884).
IX4 See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995); Gisbert
v. Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1447-48 (5th Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1454.
But see Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on other grounds
sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). The rela-
tionship between treaties and the executive branch is less clear. It is possible that
courts will apply self-executing treaties to restrict executive branch action in some cir-
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contexts, U.S. courts follow a dualist approach to the relationship be-
tween international law and domestic law: They treat international
and domestic law as distinct, they rely on domestic law to determine
international law's status within the U.S. legal system, and, in case of a
conflict, they generally give domestic law primacy over international
law.' 85
Consistent with this dualistic approach, U.S. courts are likely to
judge the legal validity of the RUDs ultimately by reference to domes-
tic constitutional law. In recognition of this point, critics have argued
that the RUDs are inconsistent with constitutional principles relating
to separation of powers, the Supremacy Clause, the treaty power, and
federalism. In this Part, we explain why these constitutional argu-
ments are unpersuasive. We begin, however, with some general ob-
servations concerning the nature of judicial review in the context of
the RUDs.
A. Judicial Review
Critics of the RUDs argue for extraordinary judicial intervention
into the treaty process. Consider the Domingues case, in which the pe-
titioner argued that Nevada's death penalty for juvenile offenders vio-
lated Article 6 of the ICCPR. 6 For the petitioner to prevail, a U.S.
court would have had to invalidate the treatymakers' reservation to
Article 6; determine that the United States was nonetheless still bound
by the entire treaty, including the provision to which it declined con-
sent; disregard the non-self-executing declaration; and hold that the
entire treaty, including the provision to which the United States did
not consent, thereby applied to preempt Nevada law. To state these
claims is to understand why courts are not likely to engage in the ag-
gressive forms ofjudicial review needed to credit them.
U.S. courts have never exercised judicial review to invalidate ei-
ther the domestic or international effects of a treaty on structural con-
stitutional grounds. In part, this is because the text of the Constitu-
cumstances. Cf. United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) (assuming
that executive branch violation of a self-executing extradition treaty would provide a
basis for dismissing a criminal prosecution). The validity of the President's termination
of a treaty, however, may be nonjusticiable. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-03
(1979) (plurality opinion).
18 See generally Curds A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Interna-
tionalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530-31 (1999) (explaining differences be-
tween "monist" and "dualist" approaches to the relationship between international and
domestic law).
186 See supra text accompanying notes 7-13.
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tion is relatively silent about the treatymaking process. As Hayden
notes, the Treaty Clause's "elasticity in details" left "to successive Sen-
ates and to successive Presidents the problem and the privilege of de-
termining under the stress of actual government the precise manner
in which they were to make the treaties of the nation."1 87 U.S. courts
also have recognized that, although treaties are legal instruments,
their creation and especially their enforcement are heavily informed
by political factors.' 8 These attributes of the treaty power, taken to-
gether, have resulted in numerous practical and sometimes changing
accommodations among the treatymakers (some of which have pro-
voked disagreement) about how treaties are made, enforced, and
terminated. Examples include the particular procedures for making
treaties, ' 9 the rise of congressional-executive agreements as a substi-
tute (or near-substitute) for treaties, 190 and the power to terminate
treaties, TM none of which is addressed by constitutional text, and all of
which have developed in particular ways as a result of the contingen-
cies of domestic and international politics.
Recognizing the lack of textual guidance and the importance of
political contingency in this context, U.S. courts have taken a largely
passive role in the institutional developments concerning the making
and enforcement of treaties. They usually defer to the accommoda-
tions of the political branches (such as with the rise of congressional-
executive agreements)192 or abstain from adjudicating disputes be-
tween the political branches (such as over the termination of trea-
ties).' Similarly, they consider many matters pertaining to the nego-
7 HAYDEN, supra note 26, at 2.
See, e.g., The Head Monty Cases, 112 U.S. at 598 ("A treaty is primarily a compact
between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the
interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it.").
' HENTUN, supra note 24, at 177-78.
, See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 303 cmt. e (1987) ("The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive
agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance.");
HENKIN, supra note 24, at 217 ("[I]t is now widely accepted that the Congressional-
Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is a complete al-
ternative to a treaty .... " (citations omitted)).
HENmN, supra note 24, at 211-14.
'"z See generally Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (N.D.
Ala. 1999) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the North American Free Trade
Agreement); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 799 (1995) (evaluating the constitutionality of international accords reached as
congressional-executive agreements).
",t See Goldweater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (plurality opinion) (express-
ing the view of fourJustices that the President's constitutional authority to terminate a
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tiation, observance, and status of treaties to be "political questions"
committed to the discretion of the political branches.14 They also
give "great weight" to the executive branch's interpretation of a
treaty. 9' And, of course, judicial deference to political branch ar-
rangements is especially strong in situations, as with the RUDs, in
which the political branches all agree on the assertion of constitu-
tional power.""
With these points in mind, we now turn to the specific constitu-
tional arguments made by critics of the RUDs.
B. Separation of Powers
Some commentators have suggested that the RUDs violate separa-
tion of powers principles. 9 7 There are several related claims here.
One is that the RUDs may infringe on the President's constitutional
prerogatives in making treaties. Another is that RUDs are "antimajori-
tarian" because they allow a minority of senators to force limitations
on treaties through their power to block the two-thirds advice and
consent needed for ratification.' 98 Yet another is that the RUDs con-
stitute an improper "line-item veto" because the Senate is in effect try-
ing to change the terms of the treaty.99 Finally, some commentators
have claimed that the RUDs improperly interfere with the role of the
judicial branch in interpreting treaties.
treaty is a nonjusticiable political question).
Edwin D. Dickinson, Editorial Comment, International Political Questions in the
National Courts, 19 ANI.J. INT'L L. 157, 161 & n.17 (1925) (citing cases and examples).
195 United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194
(1961); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 326(2) (1987); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Af-
fairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 701-07 (2000).
196 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981). The opinion notes:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from
Congress, he exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by Con-
gress. In such a case the executive action "would be supported by the strong-
est of presumptions and the widest latitude ofjudicial interpretation, and the
burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it."
Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring)); cf HAYNES, supra note 21, at 608 ("No President has ever taken
the ground that the Senate's right to amend treaties is not included in the power to
reject or to ratify.").
97 See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 4; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4.
98 Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 600-01.
19 John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, 45 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1213, 1233-34 (1996). This argument was also made in the Domingues case, dis-
cussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 7-13.
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Separation of powers claims are often difficult to assess because
there is no settled understanding of the proper relationship among
the three branches of the federal government. Regardless of whether
one views these matters from a formalist or functionalist perspective,200
however, the various arguments made against RUDs under the rubric
of separation of powers are unconvincing. This is especially true, we
hope to show, when one descends from abstract concerns about de-
mocracy and executive power, and attends to the concrete terms and
structure of the Constitution.
Most of the separation of powers claims against the RUDs relate to
the separation between the legislative and executive branches. There
are three fundamental problems with these claims. First, the factual
supposition underlying the claims-that the Senate "imposes" the
RUDs on an otherwise unwilling President-is simply false. As dis-
cussed above, RUDs to human rights treaties all have been proposed
by presidents in the first instance rather than by the Senate, and they
are often adopted by the Senate without change. The Senate some-
times revises proposed presidential RUDs, but always in cooperation
with the Executive Branch, always in a modest way, and sometimes in
the direction of narrowing the scope of the RUDs.Y Even if RUDs
could, in theory, constitute interference with presidential power, a
point that we contest below, interference is not an issue in the area of
human rights RUDs, where the President and Senate have worked to-
gether.
Second, even if the Senate attached RUDs unilaterally, the RUDs
would not in any way bind the President. The Senate is required to
attach the RUDs before, and not after, ratification, °2 and the Presi-
For a description of these perspectives, see Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers
and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1522-31 (1991); Thomas NV. Merrill, The
Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REv. 225, 227; Peter L.
Strauss, Fornal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish In-
consistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987).
j,,l For example, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ultimately en-
dorsed the Torture Convention, it noted that the RUDs were "the product of a coop-
erative and successful negotiating process between the executive branch, this commit-
tee, and interested private groups." REPORT OF THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. ExEc. REP. No. 101-30, at 4 (1990). Of course, this
cooperation takes place against the background of the Senate's potential threat of
nonconsent, a point that we discuss below.
See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 180 (1901) ("The
meaning of the treaty cannot be controlled by subsequent explanations of some of
those who may have voted to ratify it."); id. at 183 (Brown,J., concurring) ("The Senate
has no right to ratify the treaty and introduce new terms into it, which shall be obliga-
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dent is never obligated to accept the RUDs. If he disagrees with them,
he can simply refuse to ratify the treaty, as several presidents have in
fact done (outside of the human rights context).2" This distinguishes
RUDs from a true line-item veto, in which one branch, the Executive,
is attempting to bind another branch, Congress, to some parts of the
legislation while vetoing other parts. It also distinguishes them from
the line-item veto and one-house veto provisions that have been held
invalid by the Supreme Court. The Court held those veto provisions
to be invalid because they constituted attempts by one branch or
house of the legislature to alter already-enacted law.2 4 RUDs do not
alter already-enacted law. Rather, they are analogous to a bill passed
by both Houses of Congress and sent to the President for his approval
or veto. The last constitutional actor in the process-the President-
retains the discretion to sign the bill despite disagreement with its con-
tent, or to veto the bill because of disagreement with its content. The
President plays a functionally identical role with respect to Senate
conditions. In neither case does he have sole discretion to make fed-
eral law, but in both cases he has the final say about whether federal
law is made. °5
Third, RUDs attached by the Senate are not "undemocratic" or
"antimajoritarian" in a constitutionally meaningful sense. It is true
that a minority of senators can insist on a package of RUDs as a pre-
condition of senatorial consent to the treaty. But this power flows
from Article II, which requires two-thirds senatorial consent as a pre-
condition to making treaty commitments. In other words, the minor-
ity power of conditional consent is a direct consequence of the Consti-
tution's particular super-majoritarian treatymaking procedure. This is
but one of many devices in the Constitution designed to protect mi-
tory upon the other power. . . ."); N.Y. Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 23 (1898)
(refusing to give effect to a treaty proviso adopted by the Senate because "there is no
evidence that it ever received the sanction or approval of the President").
203 For example, President Taft declined to ratify arbitration treaties with France
and Great Britain after the Senate insisted on certain reservations. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 reporters' note
3 (1987).
204 See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998) (invalidating Line Item Veto
Act because, unlike other statutes, "this Act gives the President the unilateral power to
change the text of duly enacted statutes"); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952, 956
(1983) (invalidating one-House veto because "the House took action that had the pur-
pose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons").
205 Except, of course, that the Senate cannot override the President's refusal to rat-
ify in the treaty context. In this regard the Senate has less authority vis-A-vis the Presi-
dent in the treatymaking process than the House and Senate have vis-a-vis the Presi-
dent in the domestic lawmaking process.
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nority interests.'"6
One might argue that the original reasons for the Senate's minor-
ity veto-to create a structural bias against international agreements.• 207
and to protect state prerogatives '-are no longer valid. This is not a
view that we, or any branch of the federal government, share. In any
event, this argument has little purchase in the context of RUDs at-
tached to human rights treaties. In this context, Congress and the
President remain free to enact a subsequent statute that contains do-
mestic human rights protections without the limitations contained in
the RUDs.2 " This later-enacted statute, which a minority of senators
would have no power to block,"9 would, as a matter of U.S. domestic
law, supersede any prior inconsistent provisions of the treaty.
2 1
0
Finally, there is no merit to the claim that the RUDs infringe on
the constitutional role of the judiciary. It is true that the RUDs are
designed in part to affect the judiciary's interpretation and applica-
tion of the treaties in question. It is well settled, however, that the po-
litical branches, by virtue of their lawmaking powers, have significant
influence over the judiciary's interpretation and application of non-
constitutional law. Thus, for example, Congress often defines the
terms in its statutes, and there is no question that these definitions
constitute part of the law that is to be applied by the courts. More
broadly, Congress influences the scope of judicial interpretation by
controlling the content and form of federal law. The RUDs are simi-
larly part of the law created by the treatymakers, and they are there-
fore binding on courts in their interpretation and application of the
treaties. Unlike mere "legislative history," the relevance of which is
controversial in the statutory interpretation context, the RUDs are
subjected to all of the procedural requirements specified in the Con-
stitution. Nor are RUDs after-the-fact efforts by the Senate or Presi-
dent to control judicial interpretation of the treaty, since they are
formulated prior to ratification, approved by both the Senate and
2-. Other constitutional provisions designed to protect minority interests include
the Article I bicameralism and presentment process, the Article II impeachment proc-
ess, the Article V constitutional amendment process, and, of course, the Bill of Rights.
,17 See Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abroga-
tion of Treaties-The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined,
55 WASH. L. REV. 1, 33-39 (1979); Rakove, supra note 26, at 236-39.
2- Of course, this legislation, like the treaty that it would supersede, must be con-
sistent with the Constitution.
" A minority of senators might have some ability to block such a statute through
the filibuster power, just as they would have the power to block any other statute.
"1' See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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President, and made part of the U.S. ratification documents." '
C. Non-Self-Execution
Many of the constitutional arguments against the RUDs have been
directed at the non-self-execution declarations. These arguments boil
down to two claims: first, that the declarations violate the terms of the
Supremacy Clause; and, second, that they exceed implicit limits on
the scope of the treaty power.
1. The Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause states in relevant part that "all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby.""' Some commentators have argued
that this language mandates that human rights treaties have the status
of self-executing federal law, regardless of the wishes of the U.S.
treatymakers."' As Professor Henkin states, "treaties are declared to
be the supreme law of the land .... [I] t should not require legislative
implementation to convert [a treaty] into United States law."2 14 Hen-
kin concludes that the "pattern of non-self-executing declarations [at-
tached to human rights treaties] threatens to subvert the constitu-
tional treaty system.
"""
Although the word "shall" in the Supremacy Clause gives this ar-
gument surface plausibility, the argument becomes doubtful once one
considers the purposes of the Supremacy Clause and its well-settled
application outside the RUDs context. By its terms, the Clause obvi-
ously does make federal laws supreme over state laws. The Clause
does not, however, purport to affect the power of U.S. lawmakers to
define the domestic scope of the law they make, either as to the states
or as to other federal laws. In other words, the Clause does not, as
RUDs critics would have it, operate as a limit on federal lawmaking
power.
211 There has been substantial debate, especially in the context of arms control
treaties, over whether presidents have the power to "reinterpret" treaties after ratifica-
tion. For examples of some of the positions in this debate, see Symposium, Arms Con-
trol Treaty Reinterpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1351 (1989). The RUDs to the human
rights treaties do not implicate this debate.
212 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2:3 See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 4, at 527; Henkin, supra note 4, at 346.
2 4 Henkin, supra note 4, at 346.
215 Id. at 348.
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Three examples illustrate this point. First, the Supremacy Clause
makes federal statutes, like treaties, the supreme law of the land.
Nonetheless, Congress frequently specifies that federal statutes do not
preempt state law, do not invalidate prior federal law, or do not create
a private cause of action. 16 Second, although congressional-executive
agreements-which are equivalent to treaties on the international
plane-are considered part of the supreme law of the land,217 it is
widely accepted that Congress and the President can limit the self-
executing effect of these agreements."8 Third, and most directly rele-
vant, it has long been settled that, notwithstanding the Supremacy
Clause, not all treaties are self-executing. 9
With respect to the last point, critics of the RUDs generally con-
cede that not all treaties are self-executing. They argue, however, that
the self-execution issue must be resolved solely by reference to the
terms of the treaty negotiated with foreign nations, not by conditions
unilaterally imposed on the treaty by the Senate or President. Noth-
ing in the language of the Supremacy Clause or in U.S. historical tra-
dition suggests that this is true. As noted above, federal lawmakers
generally have the power to limit the domestic effects of their enact-
ments, and there is no reason to believe that the treatymakers should
216 For examples of statutes with these limitations, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(7)
(Supp. 1996) ("Nothing in this subsection [concerning asylum applications] shall be
construed to create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally en-
forceable by any party against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other
person."); 16 U.S.C. § 5204 (1994) ("This chapter does not preempt a State law or lo-
cal ordinance that provides for civil or criminal penalties for conduct that violates this
chapter."); 18 U.S.C. § 38 (2000) ("This section does not preempt or displace any
other remedy, civil or criminal, provided by Federal or State law for the fraudulent im-
portation, sale, trade, installation, or introduction into commerce of an aircraft or
space vehicle part.").
07 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 (1987).
A See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 24, at 217 n.**; Damrosch, supra note 4, at 525-26;
Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 641. For example, in the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, which authorizes the latest GATT agreement, Congress stated that:
"No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any
such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the
United States shall have effect." Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(a) (1), 108 Stat. 4809
(1994). Congress also stated that no one other than the United States "shall have any
cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements" or challenge
"any action or inaction ... of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision
of a State on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent" with one of the
agreements. Id. § 102(c)(1).
• Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253, 314 (1829), overruled in part ly United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51
(1833).
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have less power in this regard. Moreover, it has long been accepted
that, for separation of powers reasons, certain treaties, such as those
that declare war, create criminal liability, appropriate money, or im-
pose taxes, are non-self-executing regardless of their terms.220
In any event, even if it were true that the issue of self-execution
had to be determined solely by reference to the terms of the treaty,
the United States's non-self-execution declarations are in fact part of
the terms of the treaties. They are included within the U.S. instru-
ment of ratification that defines the nature of the U.S. obligations to
other countries, and all other parties to the treaties are on notice of
them.22 Moreover, unlike some of the United States's substantive res-
ervations, no nation has specifically objected to the non-self-execution
declarations. It would be difficult for any nation to do so since many
nations' constitutions render all treaties non-self-executing and re-
quire separate implementing legislation for the treaties to have do-
mestic force. Thus, even if the treatymakers could control the domes-
tic scope of a treaty only by including limitations within the treaty
itself, a point for which there is no support, that is precisely what the
non-self-executing declarations accomplish.
Critics of the RUDs sometimes quote from early historical materi-
als to the effect that the inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause
was designed to reduce treaty violations attributable to the United
States. They argue that non-self-execution declarations may contra-
vene this purpose by heightening the risk that the United States will
violate international law.222 None of this historical evidence, however,
suggests that the Supremacy Clause was meant to limit the treatymak-
ers' control over the domestic force of treaties. Rather, it shows only
that the Framers wished to give the national government the power to
220 See, e.g., The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925); RESrATEMENT"
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 reporters' note
6 (1987); CRS STUDY, supra note 15, at 48-49.
221 This is a point that has consistently been emphasized by the Senate and various
presidential administrations. See, e.g., 1979 Hearings, supra note 80, at 40 (statement of
Jack Goldklang, Department of Justice); GENOCIDE CONVENTION REPORT, supra note
89, at 16-17. The fact that the RUDs are included within the U.S. instrument of ratifi-
cation distinguishes them from, for example, the twenty-eight "conditions" adopted by
the Senate in connection with its approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a
treaty that expressly disallows reservations. Resolution of Ratification for the Chemical
Weapons Convention, S. Res. 75, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REC. S3651 (daily ed. Apr.
24, 1997) (enacted).
= See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 4, at 58; Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four Doc-
trines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 695, 716-17 (1995).
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prevent treaty violations by U.S. states if they so desired.223 The inclu-
sion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause, in other words, was designed
to enhance the ability of the federal government to compel state
compliance with treaties, not to restrict the federal government's
flexibility in determining whether and how to comply with interna-
tional law.
2. Scope of the Treaty Power
The second argument made against the non-self-execution decla-
rations is that even if they do not violate the Supremacy Clause, they
exceed the scope of the treaty power. Here it is argued that Article 1I
only allows the treatymakers to make "Treaties," and that non-self-
execution declarations are not encompassed within that term. These
declarations, the argument goes, concern only the domestic imple-
mentation of the treaty and thus are not part of the international
agreement itself."11 As Professors Riesenfeld and Abbott put it, the
Senate "does not have a constitutionally mandated power to unicam-
erally adopt rules applicable to the United States or its citizens merely
because the Senate purports to act under the treaty power.,20
There are a number of problems with this argument. As noted
above, the RUDs are approved by the Senate and President together
and thus are not unicamerally imposed by the Senate. Moreover, the
non-self-execution declarations are included within the U.S. instru-
ment of ratification, and other nations are therefore on notice of the
declarations and have an opportunity to object to them. As a result,
they do in fact form part of the international agreement-the
"Treaty," to use the term in Article I--entered into by the U.S.
treatymakers.
To the extent that critics of the RUDs are arguing that the treaty-
Y For documentation of this point, see John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution:
Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1955
(1999), andJohn C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking. A Textual and Structural Defense
of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2218, 2218 (1999). See also THE FEDERALIST
No. 22, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that, under
the Articles of Confederation, "[t]he treaties of the United States ... are liable to the
infractions of thirteen different legislatures"); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (M. Fan-and ed., 1911) (noting concern by James Madi-
son regarding "[t]he tendency of the States to these violations" of the law of nations
and treaties).
224 See, e.g., Dearborn, supra note 4, at 239-44; Halberstam, supra note 4, at 68-70;
Quigley, supra note 4, at 1303-05; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 590-600.
Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 589.
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makers lack the power under Article II to include treaty conditions
that are "domestic" in nature, their argument proves too much. If the
treaty power did not encompass "domestic" matters, human rights
treaties, and not just their non-self-execution declarations, would be
suspect. These treaties regulate the internal relationships between
governments and their citizens. Moreover, as international tribunals
have recognized, these treaties do not impose reciprocal obligations
226in any meaningful sense. For these reasons, a number of interna-
tional law scholars, as well as the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States, have denied that there is any "interna-
227tional" subject matter requirement for the treaty power.
Critics of the RUDs have not disputed this general proposition; in-
stead, they claim that the treatymakers in effect have the power to
make treaties on any subject but no power whatsoever to determine
the treaties' domestic effects. There is nothing in the Treaty Clause or
constitutional practice under it that suggests such an unlikely distinc-
tion. The treaty power has a dual nature-it is a power to make inter-
national agreements, but it is also a power to make supreme federal
law. Just as Congress's Article I powers to make legislation include the
power to limit the effect of the legislation in U.S. courts, so too should
the treatymakers' Article II powers to make treaties be construed to
228include the power of domestic limitation. Indeed, under the non-
self-execution doctrine, it is already well established that the treaty-
makers can control domestic implementation by agreeing to treaty
terms that are not in themselves self-executing. The non-self-
execution declarations are simply treaty terms that achieve this result
more generally.
Support for this conclusion comes from the practice of congres-
sional-executive agreements. As mentioned above, non-self-execution
226 For example, as noted above, the International Court of justice has stated that
with human rights treaties, "one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvan-
tages to states, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights
and duties." 1951 L.CJ. at 23; see supra note 144 and accompanying text. Similarly, the
ICCPR's Human Rights Committee has stated that human rights treaties "are not a web
of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations" and that the "principle of inter-State
reciprocity has no place" in this context. General Comment 24(52), supra note 121,
i 17.
227 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 302 reporters' note 2 (1987); HENKIN, supra note 24, at 197-98.
228 Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 303 reporters' note 4 (1987) (explaining that the attachment of a non-self-
execution declaration by the Senate "is an expression of the Senate's constitutional
authority to grant or withhold consent to a treaty").
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declarations can be attached to congressional-executive agreements.2 9
This shows that nothing inherent in the power to make international
agreements precludes control over the domestic scope of these
agreements. In addition, the dramatic increase in the use of congres-
sional-executive agreements in place of treaties has been justified on
the ground that the bicameral process for making international
agreements better reflects majoritarian preferences than does the two-
210thirds senatorial consent process. But this is precisely the end
served by non-self-execution declarations, which ensure that impor-
tant domestic legal changes are implemented through the bicameral
legislative process. The non-self-execution declarations are thus justi-
fied by the same majoritarian aims that support the interchangeability
231of congressional-executive agreements and treaties.
D. Potential Limits
We do not mean to suggest that there are no limitations on the
conditional consent power of the President and Senate. Presumably,
the conditional consent power is subject, like the treaty power more
generally, to the individual rights protections in the Bill of Rights.
232
We can imagine three additional limitations. We do not necessarily
embrace these limitations; we merely wish to show that these possible
limitations would not apply to the conditions imposed in connection
with human rights treaties.
One possible limitation is that the condition must have some rela-
tionship to the treaty. As the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States argues, "[s]urely, a condition that has no rela-
tion to the treaty would be improper, for example, a requirement that
the President dismiss or appoint some cabinet officer., 233 This limita-
tion is simply a weak nexus requirement that presumably attaches to
all exercises of constitutional power.23 As the Restatement (Third) ac-
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
HENKIN, supra note 24, at 217.
"3 Although we do not dispute the general constitutionality of congressional-
executive agreements, we take no position here on the proper degree of interchange-
ability between such agreements and Article II treaties.
" See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957)
(plurality opinion).
-3- RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 303 cmt. d (1987).
14 For example, the Supreme Court has held that conditions attached by Congress
in the exercise of its spending power must have a reasonable relationship to the pur-
pose of the spending. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
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knowledges, the non-self-execution declarations meet this require-
ment, since they concern the terms and domestic status of the treaty
in question. 2 '
A second possible limitation is that the Senate cannot use its con-
ditional consent power to alter pre-existing federal law. This limita-
tion is suggested by the D.C. Circuit's decision in Power Authority of New
York v. Federal Power Commission.236 The question there was the validity
of a Senate condition, labeled a "reservation," to a treaty between the
United States and Canada concerning use of the waters of the Niagara
237River. The reservation stated that "no project for redevelopment of
the United States' share of such waters shall be undertaken until it be
specifically authorized by Act of Congress. "2m The question in Power
Authority was whether the reservation invalidated the Federal Power
Commission's pre-existing licensing authority under the Federal
Power Act of 1920.23' The D.C. Circuit concluded that the reservation
did not have this effect because, despite its label, it was not intended
by the Senate to be a condition of ratification.240
In reaching this conclusion, the court suggested that if the Senate
had intended the statement to be a condition of ratification, the con-
dition might have been beyond the Senate's powers. 24' To the extent
the court was insinuating that non-self-execution declarations per se
are constitutionally suspect, we disagree for the reasons already out-
lined above.242 Our present concern is with a narrower limitation sug-
235 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 303 cmt. d (1987).
22 6 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss as
moot sub nom. Am. Pub. Power Assoc. v. Power Auth., 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
237 Convention on Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River, Feb. 27, 1950, U.S.-
Can., 1 U.S.T. 694, T.I.A.S. No. 2130.
2-8 Id. at 699.
239 16 U.S.C. § 791a-830 (1994).
240 One of the three judges on the panel dissented, arguing that the Senate in-
tended its "reservation" to be a condition of ratification and that the condition was a
valid exercise of the Senate's advice and consent power because it was related to the
treaty. Power Auth., 247 F.2d at 544 (Bastian, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge also
argued that if the condition were in fact beyond the Senate's powers, the United States
would not be a party to the treaty at all because the Senate would not have given effec-
tive consent. Id.
241 Id. at 543.
242 Some have drawn this inference from the court's statement that the Constitu-
tion might not allow the federal treatymakers to create binding treaties, or conditions
on treaties, addressing matters of "purely domestic concern." Power Auth., 247 F.2d at
543; see Halberstam, supra note 4, at 69; Quigley, supra note 4, at 1303-05; Riesenfeld &
Abbott, supra note 4, at 590-600. For a strong defense of the Niagara reservation's va-
lidity, see Henkin, supra note 41; see also Damrosch, supra note 4, at 527 n.48 (conclud-
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gested by Power Authority. The Senate's "reservation" in that case, if
treated as a binding treaty condition, would have limited the effect of
a pre-existing domestic statute that, by its terms, governed the devel-
opment of the Niagara River waters. The court might have believed
that the Senate was attempting, through its conditional consent
power, to change existing law without the involvement of the House
of Representatives.2 Assuming that this characterization of the Niag-
ara reservation is accurate,24 it is conceivable that such an exercise of
the conditional consent power would exceed the Senate's powers un-
der Article II. On the other hand, longstanding case law suggests that
U.S. treatymakers acting together have the power to override a prior
inconsistent federal statute, 4  so it is not clear why the Senate cannot
condition its consent on such an effect. In any event, such a limita-
tion would not affect the validity of non-self-execution declarations,
which are designed to avoid changing existing law without full partici-
pation of the House. 6
Third, and finally, the Senate's conditional consent power might
be limited to the extent that it unduly impinges on the prerogatives of
ing that the reasoning of the PowerAuthority decision "would probably not be extended
to non-self-executing declarations"); cf Power Auth., 247 F.2d at 542 (stating that "[t] he
Senate could, of course, have attached to its consent a reservation to the effect that the
rights and obligations of the signatory parties should not arise until the passage of an
act of Congress" and that "[s]uch a reservation, if accepted by Canada, would have
made the treaty executory").
.A That is precisely how Professors PhilipJessup and Oliver Lissitzayn characterized
the issue in a brief they submitted in support of the Power Authority. Opinion of
Phillip C. Jessup & OliverJ. Lissitzyn for the Power Authority of the State of New York
(Dec. 1955), quoted in Bishop, supra note 138, at 319-20.
i44 Professor Henkin contested that characterization of the Niagara reservation,
arguing that "[t]he President and Senate have merely refused to throw new and valu-
able resources into an old established system of development which Congress may not
have intended and may not now desire." Henkin, supra note 41, at 1173.
' See supra note 3. In truth, although U.S. case law refers to a last-in-time relation-
ship between treaties and conflicting federal statutes, most decisions applying this rule
have involved statutes that override treaties rather than treaties that override statutes.
;1. Perhaps the best reading of Power Authority is that it simply applies an interpretive
presumption against overriding federal legislation by means of treaty conditions. If so, it
may be consistent with the general presumption against repealing federal statutes by
implication. See, e.g., United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164,
168 (1976) (stating that "[i]t is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that re-
peals by implication are not favored"); Posadas v. Nat. City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503
(1936) (same). It is also consistent with what appears to be a trend in recent lower
court decisions towards a presumption against interpreting treaties to be self-
executing. Goldstar (Panama) SA. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992);
More v. Intelcom Support Servs., Inc., 960 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1992); Frolova v. U.S.S.R.,
761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985). See generally Bradley, supra note 185, at 541 (discuss-
ing this trend).
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the other branches of the federal government. By analogy, Article II
gives the Senate a role in consenting to the appointment of ambassa-
dors, judges, and other officers in addition to its role in consenting to
treaties. It is possible that conditions attached by the Senate to such
appointments-such as a condition requiring that an appointed judge
vote a certain way, or a condition requiring that an ambassador pur-
sue a particular policy with another country-would be unconstitu-
tional. If so, it would be because the condition interfered with the
constitutional prerogatives of another branch, such as the independ-
ence of the judiciary or the executive's discretion in conducting for-
eign affairs. The RUDs to the human rights treaties do not raise such
constitutional concerns. As we explained above, they do not impinge
on the power of the judiciary because they merely determine the con-
tent of the law to be interpreted, a power that federal lawmakers un-
247controversially possess. Similarly, since the conditions concern only
the scope and content of treaties-the ratification of which are the
joint responsibility of the Senate and President-they do not interfere
with whatever sole discretion the executive has over foreign affairs.!4
E. Federalism
As noted, the package of RUDs typically includes a federalism un-
derstanding that emphasizes that treaties do not affect the constitu-
tional balance of authority between the state and federal govern-
ments. Many commentators believe that there are no federalism
limitations on the treaty power, and therefore they question the need
for these understandings. 24 9  For reasons we have articulated else-
where, we disagree with this view. 25 The important issue for now is
247 See supra text accompanying notes 21&19.
248 See supra text accompanying notes 204-07.
249 See Henkin, supra note 4, at 345; Weissbrodt, supra note 4, at 66; see also Dam-
rosch, supra note 4, at 530-31 (arguing that non-self-execution declarations are not
needed to protect federalism).
20 As one of us has explained elsewhere, commentators who view the federalism
understandings as unnecessary may be reading Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), more expansively than is warranted. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 MicH. L. REv. 390, 425-26 (1998). Although the Court in Hol-
land suggested that the treaty power was broader than Congress's Article I powers, it
did not hold that the treaty power was immune from all federalism limitations. See 252
U.S. at 433-34 ("We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications as to the
treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way .... We must
consider what this country has become in deciding what [the Tenth] Amendment has
reserved."). In any event, Holland was decided before both the development of mod-
em human rights treaties and the tremendous expansion of Congress's domestic legis-
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not necessity, but rather the legality of the federalism understandings.
The most common legal argument made against the federalism
understandings is that they are inconsistent with the general liability
of federal nations under international law for the actions of their con-
stituent states. This principle is reflected in Article 50 of the ICCPR,
which states that "It]he provisions of the present Covenant shall ex-
tend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or excep-
tions. ' ' This argument is obviously not a domestic constitutional ar-
gument. In any event, the argument is beside the point because the
federalism understandings do not purport to deny the liability of the
United States for the actions of its states. Rather, the federalism un-
derstandings simply note that, because of the federal nature of the
U.S. government, some of the treaty obligations may be implemented
at the state level rather than the federal level. As the Bush Admini-
stration explained when it submitted a federalism understanding to
the Senate in connection with the ICCPR, "the intent is not to modify
or limit U.S. undertakings under the Covenant but rather to put our
future treaty partners on notice with regard to the implications of our
federal system concerning implementation.",
2
In a recent article, Professor Carlos Vizquez attempted to use
constitutional federalism concerns against the federalism understand-
ings. As he notes, in recent years the Supreme Court has held that the
Tenth Amendment bars the federal government from "commandeer-
ing" state governments.' V;zquez argues that if this anticomman-
deering restriction applies to the treaty power, it might be violated by
the federalism understandings.2 He observes that the United States
has an international law duty to implement its treaty obligations.
"Thus," he says, "the federalism understanding, alongside the non-self-
executing declaration, appears to commandeer state legislatures to
lative powers-developments that might alter the need for, and desirability of, the Hol-
land approach to the treaty power. This conclusion finds support in the Supreme
Court's renewed emphasis on federalism limits on the national government, even in
the foreign affairs context. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92AM.J. INT'LL. 675 (1998).
ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 50, 999 U.N.T.S. at 185.
tcd ICCPR REPORT, supra note 95, at 18.
V1_ Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
54 Carlos Manuel Vzquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1317, 1354-57 (1999); cf Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14
CONST. COMMENTARY 33, 52 (1997) (noting possible tension between the anticom-
mandeering principle and the federalism understandings in the RUDs).
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pass the laws the treaty requires."255
The obvious response to Vdzquez is that the federalism under-
standings are not intended to compel state action. These understand-
ings, in other words, are not designed to carry out an international law
duty but rather to make a political statement about the federal nature
of the U.S. system. Vzquez recognizes this possibility, but he replies
that "if the purpose of this understanding is to make compliance with
these treaties ultimately a matter of the states' option, then the result-
ing regime is in deep tension with our constitutional scheme."25 It is
in deep tension with our constitutional scheme, he says, because it al-
lows for the possibility that some state violations of treaties will not be
prevented by the federal government.257 V;zquez thus ultimately re-
turns to the argument, discussed above, that the Supremacy Clause is
designed to reduce treaty violations. The historical evidence, how-
ever, does not show that it was designed to reduce treaty violations al-
lowed by the federal government.258 By analogy, the dormant Com-
merce Clause is designed to reduce state interference with interstate
commerce, but it does not preclude the federal government from
authorizing such interference.25 9
In any event, Vzquez is wrong to assume that it is the understand-
ings that might make treaty compliance "a matter of the states' op-
tion"-the understandings merely highlight the possibility that the fed-
eral structure of the Constitution may have this effect. If, as some
commentators argue, there are no federalism limitations on the na-
tional government's ability to implement treaties, then the federalism
understandings are inconsequential. On the other hand, if there are
federalism limitations on the treaty power, then these understandings
are useful signals to U.S. treaty partners. In neither scenario are they
unconstitutional.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CONDITIONAL CONSENT
We have tried to show why U.S. RUDs practice is consistent with
both international law and U.S. constitutional law. Critics of the
RUDs, however, do not rely solely on legal arguments. Closely tied to
2 Wzquez, supra note 254, at 1356.
256 Id. at 1357-58.
257 Id. at 1358.
28 See supra Part III.C.1.
25 See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) ("When Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly
authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause.").
CONDITIONAL CONSENT
their legal objections is the view that the RUDs practice is, regardless
of its legality, bad policy. The policy criticisms are of two general
types. The first concerns the message that RUDs send to the interna-
tional community. The message, it is claimed, is that the United
States does not take international human rights law seriously.2' ° The
second criticism concerns the effect this message has on the interna-
tional community. This effect is supposedly to undermine interna-
tional human rights protection."'
As we explain below, these criticisms are misplaced on several lev-
els. Perhaps most importantly, they fail to take account of the many
virtues of the RUDs practice. They also rest on a perfectionist view of
international human rights law, as well as an idealized view of domes-
tic and international politics. And, ironically, they might well do more
harm than good with respect to U.S. participation in international
human rights law regimes and, because of the importance of U.S. par-
ticipation, to the broader human rights movement itself.
A. Virtues of the RUDs
Human rights treaties-especially treaties like the ICCPR-have a
dual nature. They are in part law-a single legal text designed to es-
tablish international obligations among all of the countries of the
world. And they are in part aspiration-broad, universalistic norms
designed to change national and individual attitudes toward human
rights in the face of substantial variations in culture, political systems,
moral commitments, and the like. Given this dual nature, as well as
the heterogeneity of the world community, it is virtually impossible to
reach agreement on a treaty text that is acceptable to all nations. This
is why, as was recognized in the early days of the human rights move-
ment, conditional consent is so important. The practice mediates the
legal and aspirational natures of human rights treaties. It recognizes
" See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 4, at 341 ("As a result of those qualifications of its
adherence, U.S. ratification [of the human rights treaties] has been described as spe-
cious, meretricious, hypocritical."); Paust, supra note 4, at 1257 ("Rarely has a formal
attempt at adherence to a treaty been so blatantly meaningless and so openly defiant of
its terms, the needed efficacy of its norms, and the very possibility of its direct applica-
tion as supreme law of the land.").
2 1 See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 4, at 349 ("U.S. ratification practice threatens to
undermine a half-century of effort to establish international human rights standards as
international law."); Weissbrodt, supra note 4, at 78 ("By offering such an extensive and
intensive set of reservations to the Covenants... those who drafted these proposals
may have undermined the basic purpose of ratifying these treaties: encouraging the
implementation of human rights throughout the world.").
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that nations of the world are politically and culturally diverse, and
makes it possible to reach agreement on and movement toward gen-
eral principles of human rights while at the same time accommodat-
262
ing national differences.
This mediating function has been particularly crucial for U.S. par-
ticipation in the international human rights movement. Since the
founding of the nation, many segments of American society have fe-
rociously resisted international entanglements. Sometimes this resis-
tance has been grounded in crass xenophobia. Often, however, it has
rested on more defensible grounds. One such ground is a fundamen-
tal belief in self-government. This belief underlies both a preference
for local decisionmaking and a general concern about the nondemoc-
ratic and nontransparent ways in which much international law is
made. In addition, many Americans are understandably proud of the
human rights protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the Re-
construction Amendments, as well as the vigorous domestic judicial
system that enforces them. They worry that U.S. involvement in in-
ternational human rights regimes might threaten these domestic
rights protections, in addition to the liberties guaranteed by the sepa-
ration of powers and federalism. A final ground for resisting interna-
tional entanglements is the belief that Americans can improve the lot
of humanity abroad not by active engagement in international and
foreign affairs, but rather by the excellence of its "example [as] a hu-
mane, democratic, and prosperous society." 63
Whatever its source and motivation, U.S. resistance to interna-
tional entanglements has been an especially potent force in the twen-
tieth century, resulting in, among other things, the United States's re-
jection of the Versailles treaty, the Bricker Amendment debates, and
262 In this respect, conditional consent is akin to the European Court of Human
Rights's "margin of appreciation" doctrine, which gives deference to national differ-
ences when enforcing the universalistic norms of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights. The doctrine recognizes that in and among pluralistic democratic socie-
ties, there is reasonable scope for disagreement over the requirements of broadly
worded human rights provisions. The doctrine thus aims to reconcile the tension be-
tween national democratic decisionmaking and universal aspirational norms. It also
aims to avoid damaging confrontations with national authorities, and thereby gradually
to legitimize international human rights norms. See generally HOWARD CHARLES
YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTSJURISPRUDENCE (1996).
263 H.W. BRANDS, WHAT AMERICA OWES THE WORLD: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
SOUL OF FOREIGN POLICY, at vii (1998). This "exemplarist" approach to international
human rights traces its lineage to George Washington and John Quincy Adams. Id. at
2-9.
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the forty-year refusal to ratify modem human rights treaties." Against
this background, the RUDs are an extraordinarily important devel-
opment. They helped break the logjam in domestic politics that had
prevented U.S. ratification of any of the major human rights trea-
ties.' And, contrary to conventional wisdom in the human rights
community, they did not do so in a way that rendered human rights
commitments empty promises. Even with the RUDs, the United States
has bound itself to almost all of the obligations in each of the four ma-
jor human rights treaties it has ratified. It has enacted domestic
criminal, civil, and immigration laws to implement the Genocide and
Torture Conventions.266 Although the United States maintained that
its pre-treaty domestic laws satisfied its obligations under the ICCPR
and the Race Convention, it legally committed itself not to retreat
from those laws. Finally, pursuant to the treaties, the United States
has opened its domestic human rights practices to official interna-
tional scrutiny by filing with international bodies a number of reports
that describe and defend U.S. human rights practices.
In these and other ways, the United States has made genuine and
significant progress towards involvement in the international human
rights system. It is very unlikely that these steps would have been
taken without the RUDs as a condition for U.S. ratification. The
United States's evolution towards participation in international hu-
man rights regimes has been accompanied by a consensus among U.S.
policyrnakers concerning the wisdom of the RUDs approach. RUDs
have had the support of every President and the large majority of
every Senate since the United States began considering the modern
human rights treaties in the 1970s. This bipartisan and interbranch
agreement is extraordinary when considered against the backdrop of
the United States's post-1950s antagonism towards international hu-
man rights law. RUDs made this possible.
With these points in mind, we now consider the specific policy ob-
jections made against the RUDs.
B. Message of the RUDs
One prominent criticism of the RUDs is that they send a message
of disrespect for international law in general, and international hu-
, See generally KAUFMAN, supra note 57; EDWARD LUCK, MIXED MESSAGES:
A,\IERICAVN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 1919-1999, at 15-41 (1999).
See supra Part II.B.
' See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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man rights law in particular."' As we have just reiterated, U.S. human
rights commitments under the treaties, even with the RUDs, are far
from empty promises. It is equally incorrect to say that the RUDs
show disrespect for international law.
Consider first the U.S. reservations, which decline to consent to
treaty provisions that violate the U.S. Constitution or that are inconsis-
tent with widely supported criminal justice practices. The decision by
the United States not to embrace these relatively few provisions does
not constitute disrespect for international law. Many nations, includ-
ing the most progressive nations in Western Europe, have also condi-
268tioned their consent to the treaties. While some nations have con-
sented to the human rights treaties without condition, there does not
appear to be any correlation between these nations, which include
Libya and Iraq, and respect for international human rights law. As Ar-
thur Rovine, a former Assistant Legal Adviser to the State Department
and current President of the American Society of International Law,
has noted, "It is very easy to sign a human rights treaty without any
reservations .... Many authoritarian regimes have done so."
269
The central problem for international human rights law has not
been selective consent to treaty terms, but rather the failure by nations
to adhere to the treaty terms to which they have consented. The U.S.
RUDs are expressly designed to ensure that the United States does not
consent to an international obligation that it is unable, for constitu-
tional or political reasons, to obey. One can object that the United
States has not assumed all of the obligations under the human rights
treaties, but it is wrong to conclude that the U.S. practice of declining
consent to a small number of human rights obligations shows disre-
spect for international law. To the contrary, it is much more plausible
to conclude that the care with which the United States crafts its con-
sent shows respect for international law and an intention to comply
with such law.
2 70
267 See Henkin, supra note 4, at 344; see also Schabas, supra note 4, at 283-84. The
legal aspects of this criticism are considered above, supra Part III.
268 See supra Part II.B.
269 Arthur Rovine, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and Understandings, in U.S.
RATIFICATION OF THE HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH ORWITHOUT RESERVATIONS? 57
(Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981).
270 As Senator Moynihan explained in urging ratification of the ICCPR, the United
States "has undertaken a meticulous examination of U.S. practice to insure that the
United States will in fact comply with the obligations that it is assuming," which "can
certainly be viewed as an indication of the seriousness with which the obligations are
regarded rather than as an expression of disdain for the obligations." 138 CONG. REC.
S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). Senator Moynihan is no opponent of international law.
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We make these points without purporting to defend the U.S. res-
ervations, and the practices they immunize from international obliga-
tion, on their moral merits. We do not contend that the reservations
can all be easily defended from this perspective, and, in any event,
such a defense would require a different article. What is important
for present purposes, however, is not our or anyone else's views about
the moral desirability of domestic laws enacted in a free and demo-
cratic process, such as laws providing for capital punishment. What-
ever the moral desirability of the death penalty, the United States
shows no disrespect for international law in not abolishing it, for it has
steadfastly declined to consent to any such international law, either in
a treaty or by custom. The United States has, it is true, largely ignored
international disapprobation of the juvenile death penalty (and the
death penalty more generally), and it is certainly appropriate for na-
tions (not to mention U.S. citizens) that disagree with this practice to
criticize the United States. Nothing in our analysis takes issue with
this. We insist only that being out of step with the rest of the world is
not, in itself, a reason for a nation to change its domestic practices, and
it certainly does not constitute disrespect for international law.
It is also incorrect to contend that the U.S. declaration of non-self-
execution shows disrespect for international law. Many nations re-
quire implementing legislation before a treaty has domestic effect,
and there is no general obligation that a nation implement a treaty in
any particular way. Moreover, the United States is under no obliga-
tion to change its domestic law after ratifying a human rights treaty if
its law already satisfies the treaty obligations. Under the terms of the
ICCPR, for example, nations are required to take steps to protect the
rights under the treaty only if the rights are "not already provided for
by existing legislative or other measures." 7' The non-self-execution
declarations therefore can be justified by the fact that the United
States already provides sufficient domestic legal protections to fulfill
its international obligations.
This latter proposition-that U.S. domestic law satisfies U.S. in-
ternational human rights obligations-is open to debate. The reason
it is open to debate, however, only strengthens the case for the non-
self-execution declaration. It is open to debate because many human
rights treaty terms are couched in broad, open-ended language. The
resulting vagueness, combined with the absence of an authoritative
Set DANiEL PATRIcK MOyNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS (1990) (arguing for strong
adherence by the United States to international law).
271 ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S at 173.
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treaty interpreter, makes it difficult in many contexts to determine
whether U.S. domestic law satisfies its international obligations.
Considerjust a few of literally hundreds of possible examples from
the ICCPR. Can one say for sure that the absence of proportional
representation in the United States is consistent with the ICCPR's
"right of self-determination"?2 7 2 Is the Supreme Court's rejection of
Lochner-style economic rights consistent with the ICCPR's guarantee of
the right "freely [to] pursue their economic... development"?7 3 Are
U.S. campaign finance laws consistent with the international human
right to "have access, on general terms of equality, to public serv-
ice"?274 Is the United States's failure to prohibit some discrimination
based on sexual orientation consistent with its obligation to "prohibit
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as... statu."'?"7 5
These questions, which can proliferate almost endlessly, show how
difficult it is to tell with certainty whether the United States is comply-
ing with all the terms of a human rights treaty. This point sheds light
on the persistent complaints that the United States is in widespread
violation of the ICCPR. One can indeed interpret the ICCPR's terms
to call into question scores of domestic laws in the United States and
many other western democracies. But one can also easily read the
ICCPR obligations as satisfied by current U.S. domestic law. There is
no authoritative international body to resolve this "legal" disagree-
ment; the ICCPR contemplates only that nations will open their hu-
man rights practices for other nations to see and, if they like, to criti-
cize. The United States is a liberal democracy with extraordinary,
although not perfect, statutory and constitutional human rights pro-
tections, and a federal judiciary that has historically protected individ-
ual rights. Its human rights protections come close enough to the line
272 Id. art. 1(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
275 Id.
274 Id. art. 25(c), 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
275 Id. art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179 (emphasis added). The United Nations Human
Rights Committee has, in fact, interpreted the ICCPR's antidiscrimination provision to
cover discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Toonen v. Australia, U.N.
GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. II, at 226, 233, U.N. Doc.
A/49/40 (1994). Other human rights treaties raise similar interpretive questions. For
example, does the use by U.S. law enforcement officials of stun belts to restrain pris-
oners violate the prohibition in the Torture Convention on "cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment"? See Torture Convention, supra note 85, 23 I.L.M.
at 1027. The monitoring committee established by the Torture Convention recently
said yes. Elizabeth Olson, U.S. Prisoner Restraints Amount to Torture, Geneva Panel Says,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 18, 2000, at A12.
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to conclude, with justification, that it need not incur the extraordinary
costs of litigation and uncertainty that accompany direct incorpora-
tion of these treaty terms into its domestic litigation system.
Of course, some nations have chosen to incur such costs. The
United Kingdom, for example, is in the process of incorporating the
European Convention on Human Rights into its domestic law, not-
withstanding the many legal uncertainties that this entails.2 6 It is
worth noting, however, that the U.S. legal system differs from the U.K.
system in a number of important respects. The United States has a
210-year-old written constitution, including a Bill of Rights; the United
Kingdom has no written constitution, and it has been severely criti-
cized for its lack of fundamental human rights protections.277 The
United States has a long tradition ofjudicial review of national legisla-
tion; the United Kingdom does not. And the United States has a
deeply entrenched federal structure; the United Kingdom, even with
its recent "devolution" of power to Scotland and Wales, has nothing
comparable. In addition to these legal differences, the size, location,
and resources of the United States are such that it may not derive the
same benefits as the United Kingdom (and other European nations)
from coordinated legal regimes.
The U.S. preference for congressional, rather than judicial, moni-
toring of the extent to which domestic law comports with interna-
tional obligations has an additional justification. Sometimes courts
look to international bodies and the writings of scholars in giving con-
tent to international obligations.28 The ICCPR Human Rights Com-
mittee has no official interpretive authority over the ICCPR, but as its
recent comments on treaty reservations indicate, the Committee is not
a body that views itself as bound by consensus international law prin-
ciples.2 ' Unfortunately, this desire to achieve progressive ends at the
expense of broadly recognized international law principles also char-
acterizes many academic writings about international human rights
law.' Since these sources sometimes influence courts, it is under-
standable why the treatymakers want to maintain political, as opposed
to judicial, control over the means of implementing the ICCPR's
k: Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); see also Sarah Lyall, 209 Years Later, the
English Get American-Style Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at A3.
277 See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN: WIHYF BRITISH
LIBERTY' NEEDS PROTECrNG 1-9 (1990).
271' See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (relying on, among
other things, nonbinding United Nations declarations and vievs of scholars).
2 7, See supra text accompanying notes 133-37.
1. See Simma & Alston, supra note 119.
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open-ended obligations.
We should emphasize that we are not suggesting that domestic law
perfectly protects human rights, either as written or, especially, as en-
forced. In the United States, however, international law is not the
principal solution to these problems. Rather, the principal solution is
to work within U.S. democratic and constitutional processes to effec-
tuate change and improvement. The critics of RUDs are obsessed
with international solutions to human rights problems. This obsession
elevates form over substance. Sometimes internationalization of hu-
man rights norms-defined as the delegation of human rights respon-
sibilities to a supranational body-can help achieve domestic human
rights reform. This was so in Europe, where there was a post-World
War II desire for human rights improvement but an absence of confi-
dence in domestic institutions to achieve those ends." ' What works
for Europe, of course, will not necessarily work for the United States,
which has a significantly different political culture (especially in its at-
titude towards international entanglements) and domestic human
rights tradition. It was extraordinary for the United States to assent to
the general norms in the ICCPR and to open its human rights prac-
tices to official international scrutiny. It does not follow, however,
that human rights progress in the United States is best achieved by
delegating the responsibility for determining the appropriate content
of human rights to bodies outside the United States.
C. Effect of RUDs
We now move from the meaning of RUDs to their effect on the in-
ternational human rights movement. We have seen no empirical evi-
dence to support the claim that RUDs undermine or threaten interna-
tional human rights law or the international human rights movement.
Rather, there is much evidence to the contrary. The United States
began ratifying modern human rights treaties fifteen years ago, and it
has attached RUDs to all of the treaties. During this same period, in-
ternational human rights law has, by any measure, flourished."" It is,
281 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation
in PostwarEurope, 54 INT'L ORG. 217 (2000).
2 For example, over 140 nations are now parties to the ICCPR, and over 50 of
these nations became parties in the 1990s. On the specific issue of the death penalty,
numerous countries decided to restrict or abolish capital punishment during the
1990s, notwithstanding the United States's refusal to do so. Amnesty Int'l, The Death
Penalty: List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries (Jan. 1, 2000), http://
www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/2000/ACT/A5000500.htm.
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of course, possible that the human rights movement would have flour-
ished even more in the absence of U.S. RUDs. Beyond vague and
conclusory platitudes, however, the critics of RUDs have not explained
how or why this is so.
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The claim that the U.S. RUDs practice harms the human rights
movement becomes even less convincing when one considers the
many ways that the United States influences human rights develop-
ment around the world outside the context of the human rights trea-
ties. The United States exerts much of its influence through the ex-
ample of its own, non-treaty-based human rights standards, which
RUDs have not diminished at all. The United States is also the nation
that most aggressively pressures other nations to improve their human
rights standards-a practice once again not affected, at least directly,
by the RUDs. More broadly, perhaps the greatest advance for interna-
tional human rights was the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold
War. The U.S. RUDs did not delay this victory. Indeed, one of the
initial purposes of the RUDs was to increase U.S. participation in the
international human rights community in order to rebut Cold War
propaganda about U.S. human rights practices.8
These points indicate another error in the claim that the U.S.
RUDs harm international human rights law. These criticisms assume
an inappropriate baseline of comparison. They assume that compared
to U.S. ratification without RUDs, RUDs harm international human
rights. This is an inappropriate baseline of comparison because the
RUDs were clearly a pre-condition to any U.S. ratification.8  The ap-
propriate question is whether U.S. ratification with RUDs or no U.S.
ratification at all is better for the international human rights move-
ment."X Viewed this way, it is hard to say that the RUDs, which facili-
tate U.S. engagement in the international human rights movement,
harm the movement.
A related argument is that RUDs undermine the United States's
2-3 When President Carter first proposed the RUDs package in the late 1970s,
commentators expressed concern that the RUDs practice would induce other nations
to opt out of many of the important treaty provisions. See, e.g., Weissbrodt, supra note
4, at 56. In fact, the U.S. RUDs practice has not led to any substantial increase in the
number or breadth of reservations by other countries. For documentation of this
point, see the record of ratifications for the treaties set forth in United Nations Treaty
Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org.
i!-4 1979 Hearings, supra note 80, at 21.
See supra Part 1.11 and text accompanying note 173.
SeeJack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States Double
Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 365, 373 (1998).
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ability to influence other nations' human rights practices. RUDs
weaken U.S. credibility on human rights issues, the argument goes,
thereby diminishing the effect of the nation's moral pressure."'
Again, critics have presented no empirical evidence to support this
proposition. Evidence to the contrary includes the facts that most na-
tions have not objected to the RUDs and that no nation has refused to
enter into a treaty relationship with the United States as a result of its
RUDs. In addition, when nations criticize U.S. credibility on human
rights, usually in response to human rights criticisms from the United
States, they do not generally refer to the RUDs. Rather, they attack
substantive practices such as discrimination, police abuse, and the
288like, without mentioning the RUDs practice. This focus suggests
that U.S. RUDs are not the currency of moral complaint, at least not
in political debates between nations, as opposed to complaints from
human rights activists. 9
We cannot, and do not, claim that the U.S. RUDs practice has no
effect whatsoever on international affairs. If nothing else, RUDs
probably feed the suspicion in some circles that the United States is an
arrogant superpower that disdains international law. We have tried to
show that the premise of this complaint-that the U.S. RUDs practice
shows disrespect for international law-is much less warranted than
conventional wisdom suggests. Perceptions do, however, matter in in-
ternational relations and this perception, warranted or not, might in-
fluence the international human rights movement Critics of RUDs
have so far not demonstrated the alleged causes or effects of this in-
fluence; nor have they shown that any realistic alternative to the U.S.
RUDs practice would be better for the human rights movement.
It may also be true that RUDs reduce the opportunities for U.S.
courts to interpret international human rights law and thereby con-
287 See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 1173 ("The Senate's practice of defacto re-
writing treaties, through reservations, declarations, understandings, and provisos,
leaves the international credibility of the United States shaken and its reliability as a
treaty-negotiating partner with foreign countries in doubt."); Damrosch, supra note 4,
at 515-16 ("Regrettably, the non-self-executing declaration and others of its ilk could
undermine the efficacy of the treaties to which they apply, both within the United
States and in terms of the potential for the United States to exercise constructive influ-
ence abroad.").
288 See, e.g., Eduardo Lachica, China Criticizes American Rights Report: Beijing Responds
to U.S. Critique With a List of Stinging Accusations, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at 3,
available at 2000 WL-WSJA 2935375; Russia Critical of U.S. Report on Human Rights, Dow
JONES INT'L NEWS, March 1, 2000, available atWESTLAW, All News Plus Library, DJINS
File.
289 See Goldsmith, supra note 286, at 372.
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tribute to the development of such law, as some commentators have
complained. This is a surprising criticism given that human rights
advocates frequently complain that U.S. courts interpret international
law too narrowly.2 In any event, numerous opportunities exist for
U.S. officials to interpret international human rights law outside the
context of judicial proceedings-for example, in their reports to the
human rights committees-and these opportunities are unaffected by
the RUDs. 22
CONCLUSION
The rise of human rights treaties has placed great demands on the
U.S. treatymaking process. U.S. treatymakers face international pres-
sures to ratify human rights treaties and participate in international
human rights regimes. Treatymakers also face significant domestic
opposition to these treaties. Such opposition is grounded in a variety
of factors ranging from concerns about altering domestic constitu-
tional lawmaking processes, to general satisfaction with the domestic
human rights law regime, to fear of international entanglement.
RUDs are a reasonable and largely successful response to these
competing pressures. They have allowed the United States to make
genuine international human rights commitments and to participate
fully in debates about, and development of, international human
rights law. RUDs also have opened up U.S. human rights practices to
official international scrutiny. These are extraordinary advances for a
nation that has instinctively, and sometimes vehemently, resisted the
relinquishment of its sovereignty to international law and institutions.
At the same time, RUDs protect a range of domestic prerogatives.
L-' See Weissbrodt, supra note 4, at 67 (arguing that the non-self-execution declara-
tions "deprive American courts of their most potent technique for contributing mean-
ingfuly to the interpretation of the Human Rights Covenants").
I Recent Supreme Court decisions that have been heavily criticized by human
rights advocates for their interpretation of international law include Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371 (1998), Sale v. Haitian Centers Counci4 Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), and
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
%' Furthermore, U.S. courts have long applied a canon of construction pursuant
to which federal statutes are construed, where reasonably possible, so that the statutes
do not violate international law. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804); Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separa-
tion of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 483
(1998). In applying this canon, courts will have opportunities to construe the human
rights treaties. See, e.g., Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 1221 S. Ct.
297 (2000); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Mojica v. Reno, 970
F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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They ensure that the United States does not make international legal
commitments that it cannot fulfill for domestic constitutional or po-
litical reasons. RUDs leave the concrete implementation of vague
human rights commitments to the federal political branches rather
than the courts. They also help preserve Congress's traditional role in
enacting domestic human rights protections, as well as the states' tra-
ditional role in regulating local matters. As we hope to have shown,
RUDs achieve these ends in a manner that is consistent with both in-
ternational law and U.S. constitutional law.
In light of these points, it might seem surprising that the legal
academy and the international human rights community have been so
strongly opposed to the RUDs. Their opposition to RUDs, however, is
simply one example of the idealistic and perfectionist orientation of
these groups-an orientation that tends to overvalue the role of in-
ternational institutions and undervalue domestic political and struc-
tural concerns. Although idealism obviously plays a crucial role in
human rights advocacy, the exaggeration and impatience that charac-
terize the opposition to RUDs threaten to make U.S. officials less in-
clined, not more inclined, to continue their involvement with interna-
tional institutions.293 In this respect, as with so many other
international human rights issues, the perfect becomes the enemy of
the good, and aspiration becomes the enemy of the law.
23 To take one of many examples, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee's General
Comment 24(52) concluded that some U.S. reservations to the ICCPR were invalid. See
supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. In response, Congress passed a bill, later
vetoed by the President, that would have cut off funding for U.S. obligations under the
Covenant unless the Committee "expressly recognized the validity [of U.S. RUDs] as a
matter of international law." Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1996
and 1997, H.R. 1561, 104th Cong. § 1504 (2d Sess. 1996).
